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Three Essays on the Economic Impact of Firm Activity
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University of Pittsburgh, 2019
This dissertation studies the economic causes and consequences of firm activity. The first
chapter explores the impact of large initial public offerings (IPOs) in U.S. stock markets on
local economic activity. Utilizing a spatial, difference-in-differences estimation framework, I
find that going public leads to an increased number of businesses in the IPO firms’ industries
and higher employment, wages, and housing prices in the vicinity of the firms’ headquarters.
Information aggregated in the IPO process plays an important role in explaining housing
price dynamics at different stages of IPOs. Neighborhoods close to firm headquarters expe-
rience modest growth in income, a smaller share of low-income residents, and an increase in
the number of nearby restaurants.
The second chapter studies the effects of international environmental policies on firms’
production and innovation, aggregate growth, and climate change. I build a two-country
and two-sector endogenous growth model where clean and dirty technologies innovate to
compete for global market leadership in final good production. I find that clean research
subsidies and carbon taxes are effective in directing production and innovations to clean
technology, though carbon taxes may encourage dirty innovation abroad. I characterize the
unilateral optimal policy path implied the model and microeconomic estimates. I find that
optimal policy makes heavy use of research subsidies and it can secure a transition to clean
technology globally with international knowledge spillover.
The third chapter investigates how consumer reviews affect employment decision. I com-
bine reviews from Yelp.com and information on the employment and wages of local businesses
in Pittsburgh. Using a regression discontinuity framework that exploits Yelp’s rounding
thresholds, I find that an extra star rating leads to higher employment and total wage bills,
while it does not affect average wage per worker. This effect also holds for other service
industries. Using textual analysis on consumer reviews, my results show that consumer
reviews on employees services do not seem to change employment decisions significantly.
iv
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1.0 Introduction
My research involves the fields of urban economics, international economics, and public
economics. The main focus of my research has been to understand the firm behavior and its
various impacts on the economy by combining original data with reduced-form regressions,
machine learning techniques, and micro-founded macro models.
In the first chapter, “Initial Public Offerings and Local Economic Activity: Jobs, Housing
Markets, and Demographics,” I study the impact of firms going public on the local economy.
I approach this problem by utilizing a spatial, difference-in-differences estimation framework
by comparing changes in outcomes (employment, business patterns, housing prices, and
resident income) before and after an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for areas very close to
the IPO firms’ headquarters with areas slightly farther away. I find that going public leads
to an increased number of businesses in the IPO firms’ industries and higher employment,
wages, and housing prices in the vicinity of the firms’ headquarters. I further compare IPOs
of different expected and final offering proceeds and find that firms with above-expected
proceeds lead to a larger housing price effect post-IPO compared with the IPO announcement
stage, and vice versa. Neighborhoods close to firm headquarters experience modest growth
in income, a smaller share of low-income residents, and an increase in the number of nearby
restaurants.
My second dissertation chapter studies the optimal international climate policies to en-
courage firms to switch from dirty to green (clean) technologies. In this joint paper with
Douglas Hanley, “International Competition in the Race to Clean Technology”, we build
a two-country, two-sector (clean, dirty) trade model in which clean and dirty technologies
compete in production. Research and carbon tax effectively encourage production and inno-
vations in clean technology, though carbon taxes may encourage dirty innovation abroad and
generally cannot avoid the carbon leakage. We estimate the parameters of the model using
the US and China micro-data on firm-level output, R&D, and patents. We then characterize
the optimal unilateral policy path that using carbon taxes, research subsidies and tariffs
respectively. we find that optimal policy makes heavy use of research subsidies and it can
1
successfully secure a transition to clean technology globally with international knowledge
spillover.
In my third chapter, “Consumer Reviews and Employment Decisions: Evidence From
Yelp.com”, I study how consumer reviews affect the employment decision. Internet review
platforms inform consumers about product quality and hence shift consumer demand. At
the same time, these reviews are also frequently read by business owners and may be used
to monitor their employees. I investigate this question by combining reviews from Yelp.com
and information on the employment and wages of local businesses in Pittsburgh. Using a
regression discontinuity design, I find that an extra star rating leads to a 3.5 increase in the
quarterly number of employees and a $2,800 increase in the quarterly total wage bill, while
it does not have any impact on average wage per worker. This effect also holds for other
non-food service industries. By conducting sentiment analysis on text reviews regarding
customer services, my results show that employment decisions do not seem to be affected by
the content of consumer reviews on employee services.
2
2.0 Initial Public Offerings and Local Economic Activity: Jobs, Housing
Markets, and Demographics
2.1 Introduction
Going public is one of the most significant events over the lifecycle of a firm. Initial public
offerings (IPOs) improve firms’ access to capital and allow early investors and employees to
cash out. This process is critical to the economy’s ability to generate wealth, employment,
and innovation (Borisov et al., 2015; Bernstein, 2015). From 2000 to 2015, there were an
average of more than 200 IPOs in U.S. stock markets each year, collecting $879 billion (in
2015 dollars) in total gross proceeds. The important role of the IPO market in the economy
led the U.S. government to enact the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, which is intended
to encourage small businesses and startups to raise funds through the IPO market, following
the decrease in small business activity in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
Although the importance of IPOs is widely acknowledged, it is unclear how firms going
public affects the local economy around their corporate headquarters. There is often signif-
icant controversy when local governments provide substantial subsidies to retain or attract
the corporate headquarters of emerging companies. In a widely-debated recent example,
the city of San Francisco offered a payroll tax exemption to Twitter for six years, worth an
estimated $22 million, to keep the company from moving out of the city.1 Supporters of
these policies point to the social and economic benefits of retaining or attracting company
headquarters, for example, growing employment, agglomeration economies, and revitalizing
neighborhoods. However, a primary concern of opponents is the impact of the rapid growth
of the company, especially with its upcoming IPO, which may drive up housing prices and
rents and force some residents to move.
1
On Twitter’s tax break, see, e.g., Twitter tax break could cost SF tens of millions more after IPO, SFGATE,
(2013); What the Twitter tax break means for San Francisco, TIME, (2014); Tax breaks for Twitter bring
benefits and criticism, The Wall Street Journal, (2016). As another example, to attract Amazon’s second
headquarters, Newark, New Jersey, offered $7 billion in tax incentives; Chicago would reportedly offer at
least $2 billion; and Maryland offered more than $5 billion.
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In this paper, I evaluate the causal impact of firms going public on the local economy.
Understanding this impact is important, as residents and local governments must grapple
with the economic impacts of having a firm going public in their jurisdiction. The main
reason why IPOs could affect the local economy is that going public provides firms access
to public capital markets, which consequently relaxes their financial constraints. Firms sig-
nificantly increase post-IPO investment in physical and human capital, as shown in Figure
1. Dougal et al. (2015) show that firms headquartered nearby tend to increase investment
as a result of agglomeration economies through skill or knowledge spillovers, sharing in-
frastructure, consumption externalities, and so on. The increase in investment and rise of
agglomeration economies are likely to attract more skilled workers to live nearby, thus driv-
ing up local housing prices. Meanwhile, newly cashed-out executives and early employees
are also potential homebuyers in local real estate markets. In all, this creates an incentive
for food service businesses to open restaurants in the area. Analyzing housing prices is a
particularly useful way to understand the local economic value of an IPO, as the net effect
of a firm going public is reflected in housing prices. A successful IPO may have a positive
impact on local housing prices at corporate headquarters. However, even if a firm invests
significantly in capital and employment post-IPO, it is still possible that the net effect on
the local housing market could be negligible in magnitude if the firm makes the investment
outside the area of the corporate headquarters, or even negative if negative externalities,
such as traffic congestion and construction noise, outweigh the benefits.
In this paper, I focus on three related questions. First, I study the effect of going public
on local employment, labor earnings, and the number of establishments around the firms’
headquarters, focusing on the key question of whether IPOs lead to an agglomeration of
similar businesses in the IPO firms’ industry. Second, I investigate whether IPOs have a
causal impact on local housing markets. Specifically, I examine whether the information
aggregated in the IPO process has any impact on the housing price dynamics at different
stages of the IPOs. Third, I explore whether the increased demand in local housing markets
generated by IPOs has caused local demographic changes (resident income), and resulting
amenity shifts (restaurants).
I assemble a unique database that includes the information of all listed U.S. firms in the
4
top 10th percentile of offering proceeds in the U.S. stock markets from 2000 to 2012, combined
with data on zip-code business patterns, single-family residential housing transactions, and
resident income. The data can be used to measure the impact of IPOs on the local economy
while addressing the potential endogeneity of the location and timing of IPO firms. The
economic literature on spatial agglomeration has recognized that such spillover effect are
often highly localized (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008; Ahlfeldt
et al., 2015). Based on this point, I test for the effect of going public on local economic
activity in a close proximity to the corporate headquarters. I approach this problem by
utilizing a spatial, difference-in-differences estimation framework by comparing changes in
outcomes (employment, business patterns, housing prices, and resident income) before and
after an IPO for areas very close to the IPO firms’ headquarters with areas slightly farther
away.
I find that IPOs have a positive and significant effect on the local economy. Zip codes that
are physically close to an IPO firm experience growth in total employment and wages. The
number of businesses in the IPO firm’s industry established nearby significantly increases,
while the total number of businesses of all industries almost does not change. Firms with
higher IPO proceeds have a larger impact on the local economy. I also find evidence to
suggest that the number of small firms (fewer than 50 employees) in the same industry as
the IPO firm increases more than that of larger firms (more than 50 employees), while the
corresponding employment effects on these firms are similar.
Next, I investigate the impact of IPOs on on proximate housing prices. The primary
analysis suggests that the sales prices of houses located within 2.5 miles of an IPO’s head-
quarters increase by about 3.0%, 3.3%, and 1.3% following the announcement, listing, and
lockup expiration of the IPO, respectively, compared with one year before the announce-
ment.2 These effects are most pronounced among firms raising above the median offering
proceeds in the sample. It does not appear that these price impacts are caused by a change
in the composition of the houses that sold. Meanwhile, housing price trend and falsification
tests provide no evidence of a spurious, positive effect due to differential housing price growth
2
I sometimes refer to an IPO announcement as an IPO filing, and use the terms pricing and listing inter-
changeably.
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at the corporate headquarters. I compare IPOs of different expected offering proceeds and
final proceeds collected, and find that firms with above-expected proceeds lead to a larger
housing price effect post-IPO compared with the IPO announcement stage, and vice versa.
Finally, I conclude by testing the extent to which the positive housing price impacts
are related to cashed-out wealthy individuals. I examine this question by investigating
how IPOs influence local demographic characteristics and amenities. The estimation results
show that zip codes that are close to corporate headquarters, especially those within 1 to 3
miles from headquarters, have higher income and a significantly lower share of low-income
residents while the number of wealthy individuals does not change significantly. Meanwhile,
I find weak evidence that new restaurant openings increase in neighborhoods close to the
sample firms. Overall, it does not appear that these effects are driven by newly cashed-out
individual, rather than post-IPO investment and job opportunities.
This work makes several important contributions to the literature. First, it is related
to recent papers that highlight the importance of IPOs for the real economy. Kenney et al.
(2012) and Weild et al. (2013) show that IPOs have significant employment effects. For
example, IPOs in the United States created 2.3 million jobs between 1996 and 2010. Borisov
et al. (2015) show that public firms experience the most significant increase in their employ-
ment during the three-year period post-IPO. Bernstein (2015) studies the effects of going
public on innovation and concludes that firms experience an exodus of skilled inventors fol-
lowing the IPO. However, due to increased access to capital, public firms attract new human
capital and acquire external innovation. Although a large body of research examines the
performance changes of firms around their IPO, this paper shows the economic spillover of
going public outside the firm itself.
Second, this paper contributes to a growing literature estimating local economic spillovers
from firm headquarters. Card et al. (2010) find that the presence of corporate headquarters
significantly increases the level of charitable giving in a city. Moreover, each $1,000 increase
in the market value of the firms headquartered in a city yields $0.60-$1.60 to local nonprof-
its. Greenstone and Moretti (2004) show that the opening of a large manufacturing plant
is associated with increases in labor earnings (in the new plant’s industry), property val-
ues, and public expenditure on local services in the counties that successfully attracted the
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plant. Greenstone et al. (2010) further show that the plant opening has an agglomeration
effect, and this effect is more significant for incumbent plants that share similar labor and
technology pools with the new plant. Dougal et al. (2015) suggest that local agglomeration
economies lead to a firm’s investment being highly sensitive to the investments of other
firms headquartered nearby, even those in very different industries. Consistent with these
studies, my results suggest that IPO firms increase investment post-IPO and give rise to an
employment increase and agglomeration effect, driving up local housing prices.
The investigation of the real estate market consequences and demographic changes from
IPOs also contributes to recent empirical research on urban gentrification. Sieg et al. (2004)
find that the successful Clean Air Act regulation in Los Angeles led to environmental gentrifi-
cation, the process of significant housing prices rise in communities with large improvements
in air quality, with wealthy households generally moving in. Zheng and Kahn (2013) find
that government-financed green space and public transit trigger rising local home prices,
new housing construction, higher-income and better-educated residents, and new restau-
rants openings in the vicinity of these areas. Billings et al. (2018) find that an unintended
consequence of the 2002 No Child Left Behind policy has been to increase housing prices
and homebuyer income in previously failing school attendance zones, which give priority in
lotteries for oversubscribed schools. More generally, this paper contributes to understanding
how IPOs affect housing values and neighborhood composition. This is important, as states
and cities across the country continue to experiment with tax break policies to attract or
retain IPO firms.
Most closely related to this paper are two recent studies that examine the spillover effects
of public ownership. Butler et al. (2016) find that IPOs are positively correlated with estate
prices, employment, and wages in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Cornaggia et al.
(2018) find that county-level employment, wages, and population growth rates decline after
correcting for endogeneity, as firms geographically expand their business operations outside
their home county following an IPO. While related, this paper has several key differences.
First and most importantly, their studies focus on identifying the impact of going public by
comparing economic growth in MSAs/counties where firms complete their IPOs to growth
in areas where firms withdraw their IPO filings. In contrast, my goal is to understand the
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spillover effects in the immediate neighborhood. I take a different approach to geography,
using a more restrictive notion of local community when constructing the treatment and
control areas. Specifically, I define a local community as the area within 5 miles surrounding
each IPO firm’s headquarters. As a result, this definition of local community is much smaller
than the MSAs in Butler et al. (2016) and counties in Cornaggia et al. (2018), which mitigates
the issue of differential time trends in the treatment and control area and having firms going
public at the same year and in the same county. Second, instead of focusing on the overall
effect of an IPO, I explore the process through which IPOs affect the real estate market. I pay
special attention to identifying separately the impacts of the IPO announcement, listing, and
lockup expiration, as firms and the general public gather and aggregate market information
at these different stages. I use the difference in unexpected proceeds to understand the
heterogeneous housing price effects. Third, by exploring comprehensive zip-code income
and establishment data, I analyze the channel through which the IPO effect operates to
understand the potential demographic changes from IPOs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the IPO process
and why it may affect the local economy, followed by a description of the data in section
3. Section 4 describes the estimating strategy, and section 5 presents the empirical results.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2.2 Background: IPOs and the Local Economy
For most firms, the primary reason why they choose to go public is the desire to raise
equity capital for the firm and create a public market in which the founder, early employees,
and other shareholders can convert some of their wealth into cash at a future date (Ritter
and Welch, 2002). While IPOs can be the most advantageous way of raising capital to
facilitate future growth, they are also associated with a substantial amount of cost and risk.
Lowry (2003) discusses that a firm’s demand for capital, investor sentiment, and stock market
conditions are determinant in timing an IPO. Once the senior executives decide to initiate an
IPO, they must file an initial registration statement, usually Form S-1, to the Securities and
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Exchange Commission (SEC), which contains the firm’s business and financial information.
After filing Form S-1, the firm markets the equity issuance to investors. The transition from
private firm to public firm typically takes about three to five months. For shares not sold in
the offering, pre-issue shareholders commit to a specified lockup period, usually lasting 90
to 180 days, during which they agree not to sell any shares.3 Figure 2 provides the timeline
of a typical IPO process in the sample.
Theoretically, in the absence of capital market frictions, the transition to public equity
markets should have no impact on the local economy. However, under financial frictions,
selling equities publicly improves firms’ access to capital. This can have a positive impact
on the local economy, because such capital is likely to finance more investments and thus in-
creases firms’ demand for employees. Kenney et al. (2012) report that firms that went public
from 2001 to 2011 created 822 jobs on average. Borisov et al. (2015) find that firms signifi-
cantly increase post-IPO investment in human capital compared with the pre-IPO stage, and
experience the most significant increase in their employment at the IPO stage of their public
lifecycle. Meanwhile, the growth of an IPO firm may cause an increase in agglomeration
economies, with skill and knowledge spillovers. Dougal et al. (2015) find that a firm’s invest-
ment has strong positive relation with the investments of other firms headquartered nearby,
even those in very different industries. They suggest that local agglomeration economies
are important determinants of firm investment and growth. Moreover, firms invest more,
leading to the development of infrastructure such as airports, roads, ports, green spaces, and
so forth. Overall, the IPO firm itself and the businesses it attracts in its vicinity will expand
by hiring more workers. Wages will be bid up in this area. The increase in employment also
creates a higher demand for real estate and thus drives up housing prices.
Another possible channel of the impact of IPOs on the local real estate market is that
early employees and other shareholders cash out through the stock market. IPOs such as
Facebook and Twitter create hundreds, even thousands of millionaires and a handful of
billionaires. These newly cashed-out individuals are likely to buy homes near the corporate
headquarters, as they seek a short commute to work, leading to increased demand in the
3
These pre-issue shareholders are generally insiders, such as company founders, owners, managers, employ-
ees, and venture capitalists who are holding a company’s stock before it goes to public.
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local real estate market. In all, increasing labor demand, rising agglomeration economies,
and high-income individuals could potentially drive up property values. This will also induce
new restaurants to open in the area. As new restaurants and other local amenities become
available, this will further attract people to live near the IPO firm.
However, one important concern is that if the housing market is efficient and complete,
local residents can anticipate an IPO and buy up the housing prices before the announce-
ment, in which case, the study would not detect a discrete jump in housing prices due to
IPO activity. However, research on housing markets in the United States indicates a lack
of information efficiency (Case and Shiller, 1989, 1990). Unlike financial institutions and
investors, homebuyers are unsophisticated market participants and tend to combine invest-
ment and consumption motives in their purchase decisions. And the high transactions costs
in the housing market make short-selling more difficult than in almost any other asset market
(Meese and Wallace, 1994). Furthermore, even without housing market inefficiency, housing
price movements may be driven by information aggregated in the IPO process. First, The
IPO completion is highly uncertain due to market fluctuations. After submitting the initial
registration form, filing firms have the option to withdraw the IPO filing. Withdrawals are
common in IPO markets, and approximately 20% of all IPO filings ultimately are withdrawn
from the SEC (Bernstein, 2015). Second, because of asymmetric information between in-
vestors and the firm and the inefficiency of the underwriters setting the expected price range,
the final offer price is hardly predictable based on information that is available when the ini-
tial price range is set (Lowry and Schwert, 2004). Van Bommel and Vermaelen (2003) show
that firms’ unexpected capital expenditures during the year after the IPO are significantly
positively correlated with the unexpected price adjustment. Their estimates suggest that
an IPO firm that receives above-expectation proceeds increases its capital expenditure by
1.34% of total assets, while a below-expectation IPO is followed by a downward adjustment
of capital expenditure by 1.33% of total assets. If the information on how much capital a
firm collects and later spends is a key factor for the change in housing prices, then a below-
expected final offer IPO is likely to lead to a lower housing price effect at the IPO stage than
the announcement stage. I present a test for this hypothesis in section 2.5.2.3.
10
2.3 Data
This paper combines comprehensive data on IPO firms, single-family housing transac-
tions, individual income tax statistics, and zip-code business patterns. This section describes
the data in more detail.
2.3.1 IPO Data
I collected data on all firms that went pubic starting in 2000 from Nasdaq’s website.
Following common filtering criteria, real estate investment trusts, closed-end funds, rights,
units, foreign issues, and American depository receipts were excluded. However, because I
only have access to housing data between 2000 and 2012, I focus on all IPOs that were filed
by U.S. firms between 2000 and 2012 for which I have corresponding housing data. The
analysis is limited to the 74 IPOs with issuing size above the 90th percentile of all IPOs in
the original sample.4 I obtained detailed information on the address, SIC code, filing dates,
pricing dates, and lockup expiration period of the IPO firms. Table 1 provides a summary
of this data set over time and space. The locations of the IPO firms are shown as dots in
Figure 3. Most of the firms are located in large metropolitan areas.
I hypothesized in section 2.2 that the potential difference between the expected and actual
IPO prices could have countervailing influences on housing prices. To test this hypothesis,
I hand collected expected IPO proceeds from firm IPO prospectuses. After comparing the
expected proceeds with the final proceeds collected, I divided the firms into three groups:
above expectation, within expectation, and below expectation. Table 2 shows a summary of
the offering proceeds of these IPOs by group. In general, firms raising higher-than-expected
final offering proceeds have lower median expected offering proceeds initially compared with
the other groups.
4
Firms that changed headquarters during the IPO process are excluded. Firms headquartered in New York
City are also dropped, because there are very few single-family housing transactions.
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2.3.2 Business Pattern and Income Data
To capture economic activity at the local level, I use the Zip Code Business Patterns
from 1998 to 2014 from the U.S. Census Bureau. The data set provides information on
number of employees, annual payroll, total number of establishments, and the number of
establishments by employment-size class for detailed industries classified by North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. An establishment is a single physical location
where business is conducted or services or industrial operations are performed,” such as a
factory, an assembly plant, restaurant, a warehouse. I explore the agglomeration effect by
collecting NAICS codes for the sample of the listed firms from the Compustat database and
then merging them with the Zip Code Business Patterns data. I use three-digit NAICS codes
to identify firms in the same industry. To understand the spatial shifts of local amenities,
I also obtained the number of restaurants from the data set, by focusing on establishments
with three-digit NAICS code 722, which is defined as food services and drinking places.
The analysis of the demographic changes uses the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Indi-
vidual Income Tax Statistics - ZIP Code Data for 2004-2014. The IRS currently provides
these data for 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2004-2014. I only use data for 2004-2014 for consis-
tency. The income variable from the IRS is important, because it tracks the incomes of
consumers living inside a given zip code, as opposed to business statistics, which provide
wage and employment statistics for individuals who are working, but not necessarily living,
in a zip code (Mian and Sufi, 2009). By combining the IRS income data for different years,
I create a panel of IRS tax return-based data on the average adjusted gross income (AGI)
per return, share of individuals with AGI less than $25,000 (lowest category), and share of
individuals with AGI greater than $200,000 (highest category) by zip code.5 I construct the
sample areas by taking all zip codes with a centroid within 5 miles of the nearest IPO firm
headquarters.
5
It was not until 2006 that the IRS Individual Income Tax Statistics started reporting the size of the group
with AGI greater than $200,000. I use this information to explore whether IPOs lead to an increase in the
number of wealthy individuals in the vicinity of corporate headquarters following the IPO.
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2.3.3 Housing Price Data
The housing price data are from a large housing transaction data set of single-family
residential properties across the United States between January 1, 2000 and December 31,
2012. The data come from DataQuick, which provides the history of housing transactions and
characteristics for houses in a large number of U.S. counties. The data consist of information
on the sales price; date; and structural characteristics, such as square footage, number of
bathrooms, number of bedrooms, year built, and lot size. Using these characteristics, I
refined of the data, removing outlying observations, love and affection sales, and houses
built prior to 1900.
The data set also includes the exact location of all the properties, which was used to
calculate the distance between each house and the nearest IPO firm headquarters. Using the
Graphical Information System, each house is matched to the closest IPO firm headquarters
within a 10-mile radius. The distances to those firms are then recovered. Houses that are not
within 10 miles of any firm are dropped. The analysis focuses on the treatment and control
groups within a 5-mile radius, to minimize the threat of any location-specific unobservable
differences that may affect the price dynamics. Section 2.5.2.1 discusses the sensitiveness for
the choice of a 2.5 mile cutoff for the treatment and control groups.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the attributes of the houses in the primary
housing data set. The columns labeled “within 2.5 miles,” “2.5 to 5 miles,” and “5 to 10
miles” provide summary statistics for houses within these distances to an IPO firm. The
summary statistics indicate that houses that are closer to an IPO firm tend to be smaller,
somewhat older, and have fewer rooms. In general, the differences in housing characteristics
between houses within 2.5 and 2.5 to 5 miles are smaller than those within 2.5 and 5 to 10
miles. These differences in housing characteristics suggest that corporate headquarters are
not chosen in random locations. However, the empirical strategy does not explicitly rely on
treated properties being similar to control properties, but on similar housing price trends
between these two areas over time.
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2.4 Empirical Methodology
I seek to study the causal impact of a firm going public on the local economy. I discuss
that going public allows firms to raise capital for investments in not just capital expansion,
but also human capital. Meanwhile, early employees and shareholders cash out from the IPO
market. The increase in investments may give rise to agglomeration economies. These are
likely to attract richer and more educated people to live nearby and induce new restaurants
to open in the area. As new restaurants and other local amenities become available, this will
further attract people to live near the IPO firm. Meanwhile, the rising local housing demand
will drive up housing prices in the vicinity of IPO firms. The empirical work will study each
aspect in this chain. Because the business pattern and income data have different geographic
units and frequency compared with the housing transaction data, I use two identification
strategies to study the effects.
2.4.1 Effects of IPOs on the Local Economy
I first focus on estimating the economic spillovers of an IPO on local employment, wage
bills and the number of establishments in the geographically proximate zip codes. I follow
Zheng and Kahn (2013) by assuming that the relationship between the outcome variables
and IPO activity follows a linear model:
Yzjt = α + β1Post-Filej + β2Post-Filej ·Disz + δt + ηz + εzjt
where the dependent variable Yzjt is a measure of outcome variables (employment, wage,
income, etc.) on local economic activities in zip code z when paired with IPO firm j in year
t. Post-File an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if firms file for an IPO. Disz is the
distance of the centroid of zip code z to corporate headquarters. I control for year and zip-
code fixed effects. I focus on the 3 years before and after the IPO filing in this analysis. The
coefficients of interest are β1, which captures the local economic spillover effects following
IPO activities compared with three years earlier, and β2, which shows whether the places
close to IPO firms have a larger effect relative to places that are farther away post-IPO filing.
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To interpret the estimates from the baseline equation as causal effects of IPOs on local
communities, it must be true that zip codes that are close and far from corporate headquar-
ters would have experienced equal average economic growth in the absence of IPOs. I test
for preexisting differences in income trends using the event-study framework of Jacobson
et al. (1993), by examining the effect of going public in each year before and after an IPO
filing. This transforms the baseline specification in equation (2.4.1) into:
log(Yzjt) = α +
3∑
k=−2
βk1Y ear
k
zt +
3∑
k=−2
βk2Y ear
k
zt ·Disz + δt + ηz + εzt
Thus, the estimate of βk2 allows testing whether IPO effects are increasingly likely to occur
near the corporate headquarters over time. To rule out potentially confounding pre-IPO
trends in local economic growth, I expect βk2 ≈ 0,∀k < 0.
2.4.2 Effects of IPOs on Real Estate Markets
For the empirical evaluation of the effects of going public on local housing prices, I use
a quasi-experimental hedonic approach. In general, the transaction price of a property is a
function of the characteristics of that property as well as those of the neighborhood. Applica-
tions of this technique have included attempts to understand the value of education quality
(Black, 1999), air quality (Chay and Greenstone, 2005), urban redevelopment (Haninger
et al., 2014), and accessibility to a department store (Pope and Pope, 2015). I employ a
difference-in-differences strategy comparing houses in areas closer to IPO firm headquarters
with those in areas slightly farther away. The baseline hedonic model takes the following
form:
log(Pijt) =α + β1Fileij + β2Listij + β3Lockupij + δ
jTreatij
+ γ1Treatij · Fileij + γ2Treatij · Listij
+ γ3Treatij · Lockupij + Xit · ω + ηjt + εijt
where log(Pijt) is the natural log of the sales price for property i around firm j at time t.
Treatij is a group of indicators for an individual house i within the treatment area of an
IPO firm j. Fileij equals 1 if firm j files an IPO but has been not listed. Listij equals 1 if
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firm j prices an IPO and is in the lockup period. Lockupij equals 1 if the lockup expires.
Xit is a vector of housing characteristics of property i at time t. ηjt are year-by-month-by-
firm fixed effects. I also include treatment-by-year-month fixed effects for some estimation
specifications to control for treatment-specific time fixed effects. The parameters of interest
in this specification are the estimates of γ1, γ2, and γ3. The estimated impact of an IPO
announcement is given by γ1; the impacts of IPO pricing and lockup expiration are given by
γ2 and γ3, respectively.
Ultimately the impact of firms going public on housing prices depends on the sorting of
households into, and out of homes near corporate headquarters in general equilibrium. An
empirical investigation of household income changes takes the following form:
log(Yzjt) =α + δPost-Filej +
5∑
k=1
βkDkz +
5∑
k=1
γkDkz · Post-Filej + δt + ηz + εzt
where Dkz , k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} are spatial indicator variables of zip codes or houses within k−1
to k miles of a corporate headquarter, and the omitted indicator variable is an indicator
for homes between 5 and 10 miles from the nearest IPO firm. The key parameters in
this specification are the estimates for interactions terms of each of these spatial indicator
variables with post-filing indicator. These parameters shows the local effect on the treated
spatial zones.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Effects of IPOs on the Local Economy
I begin by quantifying the effects of IPOs on the local economy by estimating equation
(2.4.1). In column (1) in Table 4, I report estimates using the sample of all 74 IPO firms. The
estimates suggest that zip codes that are physically close to IPO firm headquarters experience
some growth in annual employment, although the effect is not statistically significant. Taking
the total number of establishments in a zip code as the dependent variable, as in panel (b)
column (1), the estimates are very close to zero, suggesting there is little change in the
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number of firms post-IPO. All the estimated coefficients of the two wage outcomes are
consistently positive and statistically significant, indicating that after a firm goes public,
zip codes in the vicinity of the corporate headquarters have higher wage bills and average
wages per worker, and zip codes that are closer to the firm experience a larger increase in
wages.6 I further allow the impacts of going public to vary by firms’ final proceeds (below
and above median) in columns (2) and (3) in Table 4. All the estimated coefficients for
employment, total number of establishments, and total wage bill are consistently larger and
more significant for IPOs collecting above-median proceeds, and vice versa. However, the
estimated coefficients for average wage per worker are more pronounced for firms with lower
final proceeds, suggesting that wages are less likely to be bid up around large firms. This is
consistent with the literature that local market concentration gives firms monopsony power
that they use to keep wage down (Azar et al.,2017; Benmelech et al., 2018; Rinz, 2018).
To explore the agglomeration effect of IPOs, I then estimate spatial patterns of geo-
graphically proximate firms within the same 3-digit industry as the IPO firm.7 The results
in column (1) in Table 5 show that the number of businesses in the IPO firm’s industry
increases by 17% overall post-IPO. Furthermore, if a zip code’s distance from an IPO firm
headquarters is one standard deviation closer than the others, the total number of establish-
ments within the same industry increases by 7.0% in this zip code post-IPO. The coefficients
are highly significant. Again, the median split of the sample by IPO proceeds in columns (2)
and (3) shows that larger IPOs attract more businesses within the same industry to establish
nearby. I also investigate the agglomeration effect by separating the firms by employment
size. Inspection of the models in columns (4) and (5) shows that the changes in the number
of same 3-digit firms are mainly driven by the increase in the number of small firms with
fewer than 50 workers. However, considering employment in these firms, the corresponding
employment effect from attracting big and small firms could be similar. Combining the find-
ings in Table 4, the estimation results suggest that agglomeration of businesses within the
same industry is the major source of change in the analysis. This result is consistent with
6
The results still holds but are smaller if I exclude zip codes of the IPO firm headquarters.
7
The Zip Code Business Pattern data set does not provide employment data for any specific industry.
Therefore, I use the number of firms by industry to explore the agglomeration effect.
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the literature that finds that the agglomeration effect is larger in industries sharing similar
labor and technology pools (Greenstone et al., 2010).
To understand how these effects evolve over time, I estimate the outcome variables in
Tables 4 and 5 and plot the estimated coefficients of year dummies βk1 and the distance-
by-year interaction terms βk2 , k ∈ [−2, 3] in Figures 4 and 6. These plots also provide an
opportunity to judge the validity of causal inferences on IPO effects. Panel (a) in Figure
4 presents the estimated coefficients for total employment. There is almost no changes in
total employment in zip codes closer to the corporate headquarters of IPO firms in the years
before the IPO. Local employment starts to increase following the IPO. However, panel (b)
presents no evidence on significant changes in the total number of establishments. Panels
(c) and (d) show that the total wage bill and wages per worker slightly rise in the year prior
to the IPO filing, but the magnitudes of the changes are small relative to the rise in wages
post-IPO. There is compelling evidence of agglomeration effects in the time trends shown
in Figure 6. The number of businesses within the same industry as the IPO firm increases
immediately and significantly in areas within 5 miles of the IPO firm headquarters post-IPO,
while the number was decreasing pre-IPO. And zip codes that are close to the firm share a
very similar trend. The figures support the validity of the design of the analysis, as there is
little evidence of differential trends prior to the IPO announcement.
In sum, these results show that firms going public have positive effects on employment
and labor earnings, and that they attract an increased number of firms in the same 3-digit
industries in the vicinity of IPO firms. In the following subsections, I study the impacts on
local housing markets, demographics, and amenities.
2.5.2 Effects of IPOs on Real Estate Markets
This subsection starts by examining the effect of IPOs on local housing prices in sur-
rounding areas. It then conducts robustness checks on the findings – a falsification test and
a housing composition analysis. Finally, the subsection presents a heterogeneity analysis to
understand the housing price dynamics in the IPO process.
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2.5.2.1 Primary Difference-in-Differences Results Table 2.7 presents the coefficient
estimates of hedonic regression comparing housing prices of treated properties located within
a 2.5-mile ring of an IPO firm to control properties in the immediately adjacent area. The
regressions all include treatment-by-firm fixed effects and structural characteristics of the
properties described in Table 3. The coefficients in column (1) suggest that houses located
with 2.5 miles of the IPO firm see increases in their sales price of about 4.2% after the
IPO filing compared with one year before the IPO filing. The coefficients on the interaction
terms of treatment and post-lising and expiration in column (1) show that this effect is
approximately 3.7% when firms price stocks at U.S. stock exchanges and 4.9% after lockup
expiration. As reflected in column (2), these results are robust and significant to year-by-
month-by-firm fixed effects. However, the housing price effect decreases in magnitude to
3.0% for the IPO announcement. The coefficients on IPO pricing and the lockup expiration
effect drop to 3.3% and 1.3%, respectively. Overall, an IPO increases housing prices in the
proximate area by 1%-3% comparing to the pre-IPO level. As reflected in column (3), these
results are robust when using a broader housing market as the control group. However,
the coefficients are slightly smaller and noisier but consistent with the previous estimates,
because these estimates may suffer from significant bias due to compositional differences in
the sample, or the larger treatment area may include properties that are not affected by
IPO activity. I have so far been using a window of one year before and after an IPO in
the regression. The window could be wider or narrower. I redo the difference-in-differences
analysis, extending the temporal window to include housing data from two years before and
after an IPO in column (4) in Table 2.7, and in column (6), I narrow the temporal window
to include houses sold half a year before and after the IPO. The main findings are robust to
these changes in temporal choices. To control for different housing price time fixed effects
between the treatment and control areas, I add year-by-month-by-treatment fixed effects in
columns (5)-(6). The coefficients of IPO pricing are again significantly positive, and the
estimates in column (5) are slightly larger than the estimates in column (3), suggesting an
approximately 3%-5% overall increase in the prices of homes within 2.5 miles of firms that
went public relative to homes 2.5 to 5 miles away.
To test the sensitiveness of the cutoff delineating the treated and control areas, I limit
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the sample to properties within 5 miles of corporate headquarters. Starting with a 1.5-mile
ring, I re-estimate equation as the size of the treatment area increases by a 0.1 mile ring
each time until it reaches a 3.5-mile ring. Figure 7 plots the post-announcement, pricing, and
lockup expiration coefficient estimates together with their 90% confidence intervals. With an
ideal experiment, it would be possible to detect the true treatment effects knowing the exact
delineating boundary between the treated and control areas. Otherwise, the definition would
likely be too small or too large. In both cases, the misaligned treatment-control boundaries
would lead to systematic underestimates of the mean difference in housing prices between
the true treatment and control areas. Thus, a plot like Figure 7 would be an inverse-U shape.
For all the estimates, post-IPO activity is significantly positive from 2.5 to 3 miles. Beyond
3 miles, the coefficient estimates and their confidence intervals rapidly diminish to zero.
A key assumption in the difference-in-differences identification strategy is that housing
price trends for areas near an IPO firm and areas slightly farther from the firm would
have been the same had the firm not gone public. To provide graphical evidence, I regress
the log-price on a set of housing characteristics, year-by-month-by-firm fixed effects, and
treatment-by-firm fixed effects. Figure 8 plots the daily residuals for treated properties and
untreated properties along with a local linear fit before and after the IPO announcement.
The graph shows that the pre-IPO announcement trend of treated properties is generally
similar to untreated properties, but there is a slightly upward price trend for properties
located within 2.5 miles of an IPO firm. Although this is consistent with the conjecture that
the local housing market can somehow anticipate the IPO event, there is a noticeable and
discrete increase in prices occurring in the treated area following the announcement. I also
account for this in the empirical analysis, by fitting time trends for the treatment group as
in columns (4) to (6) in Table 2.7. Figure 8 suggests that homebuyers pay about 0.03 log
price lower before the firm files for an IPO and after that, the homeowners pay a premium
for homes within 2.5 miles of an IPO firm. The residual plots presented in Figure 8 are
compelling evidence of an IPO effect.
2.5.2.2 Falsification Tests and Housing Composition Analysis This subsection
provides falsification tests to check whether the increase in housing prices after an IPO is
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due to differential trends in housing prices of homes near corporate headquarters relative
to housing prices farther away. To conduct the falsification tests, I re-estimate the model
by including false IPO dates. The false dates are set to two years and three years prior
to the announcement, pricing, and lockup expiration dates of IPOs. Table 7 presents the
falsification tests for the baseline models. Columns (1) and (3) re-estimate the hedonic price
model using a window of one year before and after the IPO. I change the temporal window
to two years pre- and post-IPO in columns (2) and (4). Of all 12 interaction coefficient
estimates that are estimated in Table 7, only one is statistically significant (at the 10%
level), providing no evidence of a positive effect due to differential housing price growth
before IPOs.
So far, the analysis has established that firms going public has a positive effect on housing
prices in treated areas close to IPO firms. This outcome could reflect shifts in housing demand
and supply. If there is a large compositional change in the types of houses that transacted
before and after, then this may signal that the observed housing price effects are at least
partially driven by supply rather than demand. I explore this issue by running a series of
regressions using the same data as in the primary analysis, with key housing characteristics
on the left-hand side and interactions on the right-hand side. These regressions continue
to control for year-by-month-by-firm and treatment-by-firm fixed effects. Once again, the
coefficients on the treatment area indicators interacted with IPO activities are of primary
interest, as they signal whether there were substantial changes in these housing characteristics
after the IPO activities. Table 8 presents the results from these regressions. None of the
interaction coefficient estimates is statistically significant. Taken as a whole, the evidence
suggests that the housing price effect is not likely driven by the supply side.
2.5.2.3 Heterogeneity Analysis The baseline model relies on the assumption that the
IPO effect is the same across different stages of the IPO activity for every firm. In section
2, I hypothesized that the unexpected final price changes may lead to different price effects
from the IPO announcement and pricing stages. For example, DreamWorks Animation
SKG Inc., the world-famous maker of computer-generated animated feature films, raised
$812 million by selling 29 million shares at $28 apiece – higher than the $23 to $25 expected
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price range in the company’s prospectus. This is a 12% increase even compared with the
highest expected capital raised. Higher offering proceeds increase firm’s capital expenditure
to finance investments and employment (Van Bommel and Vermaelen, 2003), thus leading
to a higher price effect at the IPO stage.
I address this issue by dividing the firms into three groups: above, within, and below
expectation, based on the expected IPO price range in the SEC filings of IPO firms. To
explore whether the amount of the offering’s proceeds matters, I also perform heterogeneity
analysis on firms collecting above the median proceeds in the IPO sample. Table 9 shows
the results for these specifications. Column (1) suggests that firms that experience higher-
than-expected offering proceeds have a significant impact on housing prices, starting from
listing in the stock markets. Column (2) suggests a sharp decline in the effect on housing
prices after firms reveal a lower-than-expected offering price. Column (3) shows that the
price effects for the announcement and pricing stages are not statistically different, although
the announcement effect is not statistically significant. Columns (4) and (5) suggest that
the positive housing price impact from the IPOs that collect above median proceeds in the
sample is larger and more significant relative to the baseline samples, while the impact
is smaller from below-median IPOs. Overall, these results confirm the intuition that the
treatment effect would be larger at the time of pricing for firms that collect more capital
than expected, and vice versa.
2.5.3 Effects of IPOs on Demographics and Amenities
I have shown that going public is associated with a significant increase in housing prices.
In theory, IPOs could have an impact on local real estate markets through two main chan-
nels. First, an IPO provides immediate access to the capital market in the form of initial
proceeds, relaxing financial constraints. Firms significantly increase post-IPO investments
and employment, potentially giving rise to local agglomeration economies. The employment
effect and agglomeration economies may drive up housing prices. Second, the IPO market
allows early employees and investors to cash out, increasing the number of rich individuals
at the corporate headquarters. These people are likely to buy houses themselves, leading to
22
an increase in local housing prices.
To understand the importance of the second channel channel, I use the annual zip-code
income data to test for direct evidence of demographic changes. Table 10 presents the results,
based on equation (2.4.1). Column (1) presents the regression results with the logarithm
of average gross income as the dependent variable. Consistent with the expectation, the
coefficient of the interaction term of distance and post-filing is negative, although it is not
statistically significant. Column (2) shows the regression results for the same specification
but taking the share of residents with income less than $25,000 as the dependent variable.
The results show that there is a significantly smaller share of low-income groups living
in the vicinity of the IPO firm. Furthermore, Figure 5 plots the coefficients of the year
dummies and interaction terms. Panel (b1) in Figure 5 shows the estimated coefficients
of the year dummies pre-and post-IPO. That the estimates start to decline and become
negative post-IPO indicates that the share of low-income residents decreases overall after
firms go public. Meanwhile, the coefficients of the interaction terms in panels (a2) and
(b2) remain statistically insignificant until the IPO announcement, indicating that zip codes
closer to IPO firms experience growth in income and loss of urban low-income residents after
the IPO activity takes place. I also examine how going public affects the share of high-
income individuals (gross personal income greater than $200,000 per year). Column (3) in
Table 4 suggests that the estimated effect of an IPO on the share of high-income individuals
is positive but statistically insignificant and of small size. The second entry in column (5)
shows that the share of individuals who earn more than $200,000 per year increases by only
0.07 percentage point in a zip code compared with zip codes 1 mile farther from the corporate
headquarters.
To further understand the household sorting in this area, I rerun the regression to inves-
tigate the local treatment effect in zones of different distance to the corporate headquarter. I
plot the estimated coefficients of the interaction of spatial indicator variables and post-filing
indicator in Figure 11. The pattern of the estimates by distance indicates that more house-
holds sorts into area within 1 to 3 miles from IPO firms driving up the income and housing
prices in these area, while they also crowds out low-income residents. Panel (c) shows that
there is small and insignificant increase of rich individuals, suggesting demographics changes
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are not solely driven by the cash-out individuals after IPOs.
I now test whether there are more restaurants near IPO firms. The restaurant industry
provides a good indicator of residential sorting and amenity shifts. If more people are moving
into an area, and if they are richer than the average person, then it would be expected that
the count of restaurants would increase over time in the treated areas. Column (3) in Table
10 reports the regression results for the number of restaurants by zip code. I control for
year and zip-code fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered by firms. In column
(4), the coefficient of the post-IPO announcement and distance interaction term is negative
and almost statistically significant at the 10% significance level. That is, if a zip code is
one standard deviation from the IPO firm, the total number of restaurants in this area will
decrease by 1.2% (about one establishment). In panel (c2) in Figure 10, I add interaction
terms of year and distance from an IPO firm. The results show a slight upward trend
in the number of restaurants. However, the time trend suggests that new restaurants are
increasingly likely to open in nearby neighborhoods of corporate headquarters. Overall, the
recent time trends in local resident income and restaurant count shows IPOs have cause local
demographic changes and resulting amenity shifts.
2.6 Conclusions
The news media has talked about how the recent IPOs in Silicon Valley have boosted the
local housing markets, and local residents have protested against Twitter’s IPO because they
are worried about affordable housing prices. However, there has been no academic work that
systematically tests whether large IPOs like these reported tech companies have a causal
impact on the local economy. The results presented in this paper show that firms going
public have had a positive impact on the local economy. My analysis utilizes a difference-in-
differences approach, comparing economic activities in areas very near firm headquarters with
those in areas slightly farther away before and after the IPO. I then explored the channels
through which IPOs might affect local housing prices, by investigating the effects of IPOs on
total employment, agglomeration economies, and the share of high-income individuals. The
24
findings show that IPO firms increase employment and wages and attract firms in the same
industry to establish nearby. These effects are stronger among IPO firms with above-median
proceeds.
The results from the baseline hedonic pricing model suggest that an IPO announcement
increases housing prices by 3.0%. An IPO’s pricing and lockup expiration increase housing
prices by approximately 3.3% and 1.3%, respectively. For the average-priced home in these
areas, this translates into an approximate $11,300 increase in the housing price during the
IPO filing, and $12,400 and $4,900 after the pricing and lockup expiration, respectively. I
further document that information on the final offering price adjustment has an important
effect on housing price dynamics at the time of the IPO.
Finally, I examined the possibility that increased demand in the local real estate market
crowds out low-income residents. The analysis finds evidence that neighborhoods that are
close to the IPO firm headquarters experience some growth in income and a significant
reduction in low-income residents, while the share of wealthy individuals does not change
significantly post-IPO. Meanwhile, IPOs also shift the local amenities, as restaurant openings
increase in neighborhoods close to IPO firms.
This paper shows that, beyond raising capital, going public brings in opportunities to the
local economy by increasing investments, jobs, and property values. However, it also brings
challenges, as rising housing prices and rents are likely to displace low-income residents.
Recently, firms that have taken part in tax break deals and some other tech firms have
teamed up with local governments to provide affordable housing, job training, and other
assistance for local residents at risk of losing their homes.8 Therefore, my findings have
important implications for local government policy on how to attract or retain emerging
companies and at the same time provide affordable housing for local residents.
8
See for example, California Today: Silicon Valley, Housing Villain, Tries to Make Amends, The New York
Times, 2016; Facebook Plans to Invest $20m in Affordable Housing projects, The Guardian, 2016. S.F. Tax
Break Tapped by Twitter Is Intended to Help Struggling Neighborhoods, Next City, 2017.
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Figure 1: Post-IPO Capital Expenditures and Employment Growth
Note: Panel (a) of the figure shows the common logarithm of the average capital expenditures for all public
firms and the sample firms from 2000 to 2012. Panel (b) of the figure depicts employment growth for the
two kinds of firms in Borisov et al. (2015). IPO firms are the firms that complete an IPO during 1990-2010
with pre-IPO employment data. Withdrawn IPO firms are firms that file for an IPO during 1990-2010 but
subsequently withdraw the offering and have pre-IPO employment information. Data: Capital Expenditure
data is caculated from Compustat and employment data is from Borisov et al. (2015).
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Figure 2: The IPO Process
Note: The number of days from IPO filing to the first day of trading is the mean among sample listed firms.
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Figure 3: Corporate Headquarters of IPO Firms
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(a1) (a2)
(b1) (b2)
Figure 4: Effects of IPOs on Proximate Firms by Year
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(c1) (c2)
(d1) (d2)
Figure 5: Effects of IPOs on Wages by Year
Note: I plot the estimated coefficients of the year dummies (βk1 ) and the distance-by-year interaction terms
(βk2 ) in equation 2.4.1, taking as the dependent variable the local economic outcomes in each panel.
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(a1) (a2)
(b1) (b2)
(c1) (c2)
Figure 6: Effects of IPOs on the Same 3-Digit NAICS Industries by Year
Note: I plot the estimated coefficients of the year dummies (βk1 ) and the distance-by-year interaction terms
(βk2 ) in equation 2.4.1, taking as the dependent variable the logarithm of the number of same 3-digit NAICS
firms.
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Figure 7: Treatment/Control Boundary Analysis
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Figure 8: Housing Price Residuals Plots
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Figure 9: Effects of IPOs on Demographics by Year
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(d1) (d2)
Figure 10: Effects of IPOs on Amenities by Year
Note: I plot the estimated coefficients of the year dummies (βk1 ) and the distance-by-year interaction terms
(βk2 ) in equation (2.4.1) but taking as the dependent variable the logarithm of average resident income,
share of residents with income less than $25,000, share of residents with income greater than $200,000, and
logarithm of the restaurant count.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 11: Effects of IPOs on Household Sorting
Note: I plot the estimated coefficients of the year dummies (γk) in section (2.4.2), taking as the dependent
variable the logarithm of average resident income, share of residents with income less than $25,000, share of
residents with income greater than $200,000, and logarithm of the housing prices.
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Table 1: Summary of IPOs
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C
Year filed for IPO Month filed for IPO Industry by SIC code
Year Freq. Percent Month Freq. Percent Industry Freq. Percent
2000 4 5.41 Jan. 2 2.70 Construction 1 1.35
2001 4 5.41 Feb. 8 10.81 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 13 17.57
2002 3 4.05 Mar. 6 8.11 Manufacturing 17 22.97
2003 4 5.41 Apr. 7 9.46 Mining 7 9.46
2004 16 21.62 May 5 6.76 Retail Trade 1 1.35
2005 10 13.51 June 3 4.05 Services 21 28.38
2006 7 9.46 July 5 6.76 Transportation, Communications,
14 18.92
2007 9 12.16 Aug. 10 13.51 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
2008 2 2.70 Sept. 7 9.46
2009 3 4.05 Oct. 4 5.41
2010 5 6.76 Nov. 9 12.16
2011 5 6.76 Dec. 8 10.81
2012 2 2.70
Sum 74 100.00 Sum 74 100.00 Sum 74 100.00
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Table 2: Summary of Offering Proceeds by Expectation
Above expectation Below expectation Within expectation
Median expected proceeds ($million)
Min 603.75 910.11 695.98
Max 656.25 1,026.94 754.22
Final proceeds ($million)
Median 783.00 791.50 709.55
Mean 2,838.55 938.82 1,056.51
Average change from expectation
Min 26.08% -10.30% 8.55%
Max 13.55% -19.48% -2.54%
Number of firms 29 18 24
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Housing Data
Within 2.5 miles 2.5 to 5 miles 5 to 10 miles
Price $376,924 $350,070 $316,839
(399,268) (369,995) (311,569)
Log(price) 12.33 12.29 12.28
(1.09) (1.02) (0.92)
Age 48.68 46.75 37.98
(33.49) (29.06) (30.62)
Lot size 13,591 66,700 40,525
(441,838) (10,200,000) (5,342,221)
Bathrooms 1.90 2.01 2.13
(1.28) (8.53) (6.52)
Bedrooms 2.25 2.26 2.30
(1.67) (1.59) (1.64)
Stories 1.42 1.30 1.36
(0.68) (0.62) (0.60)
Square footage 1,752.80 1,741.47 1,769.41
(1,010.81) (4,733.22) (1,144.37)
Observations 98,190 321,016 1,076,590
Note: Summary statistics for houses sold one year before the IPO filing and one year after the lockup
expiration.
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Table 4: Impact of IPO Activity on the Local Economy
(1) (2) (3)
Variables All IPOs with below IPOs with above
median proceeds median proceeds
Panel (a). Dependent variable: log (Total employment)
Post-File 0.00874 -0.0108 0.0324
(0.0206) (0.0325) (0.0212)
Post-File×Distance -0.00681 -0.000602 -0.0140**
(0.0055) (0.0092) (0.0061)
Observations 5,462 2,669 2,793
R-squared 0.984 0.982 0.988
Panel (b). Dependent variable: log (Total establishments)
Post-File -0.00713 -0.0325 0.031
(0.0216) (0.0275) (0.0271)
Post-File ×Distance -0.000509 0.00666 -0.0071
(0.0053) (0.0075) (0.0079)
Observations 5,685 2,707 2,978
R-squared 0.990 0.991 0.991
Panel (c). Dependent variable: log (Total wage bill)
Post-File 0.0347* 0.0296 0.0439**
(0.0188) (0.0326) (0.0181)
Post-File ×Distance -0.0194*** -0.0147 -0.0228***
(0.0054) (0.0097) (0.0053)
Observations 5,483 2,672 2,811
R-squared 0.983 0.982 0.988
Panel (d). Dependent variable: log(Average wages per worker)
Post-File 0.0229** 0.0400** 0.00489
(0.0111) (0.0159) (0.0156)
Post-File ×Distance -0.0117*** -0.0141*** -0.00708
(0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0047)
Observations 5,462 2,669 2,793
R-squared 0.932 0.937 0.934
Year FE X X X
Zip Code FE X X X
Note: Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. All samples are restricted to three years pre- and
post-IPO announcement. Models are limited to zip codes located within 5 miles of IPO firm headquarters.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Impact of IPO Activity on the Same 3-Digit NAICS Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables All IPOs with below IPOs with above Establishments with Establishments with
median proceeds median proceeds < 50 employees > 50 employees
Post-File 0.170*** 0.139* 0.196** 0.180*** 0.118
(0.0556) (0.0833) (0.0787) (0.0621) (0.1120)
Post-File ×Distance -0.0479*** -0.0245 -0.0677*** -0.0508*** -0.038
(0.0134) (0.0209) (0.0175) (0.0149) (0.0314)
Observations 1,255 612 643 1,239 533
R-squared 0.977 0.972 0.982 0.973 0.918
Year FE X X X X X
Zip Code FE X X X X X
Note: Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. All samples are restricted to three years pre- and
post-IPO announcement. Models are limited to zip codes located within 5 miles of IPO firm headquarters.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 6: Impact of IPO Activity on Property Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample restrictions <5 miles <5 miles <10 miles <5miles <5 miles <5 miles
1 year pre& post 1 year pre& post 1 year pre& post 2 years pre& post 1 year pre& post half years pre& post
File 0.0181 0.0225 -0.00221 0.0213 0.0192 0.0219
(0.0272) (0.0228) (0.0104) (0.0226) (0.0220) (0.0236)
List 0.00103 0.00435 -0.0113 0.00249 -0.00284 -0.000145
(0.0309) (0.0291) (0.0149) (0.0292) (0.0278) (0.0291)
Lockup 0.0308 0.0371 0.0192 0.0307 0.03 0.0311
(0.0298) (0.0282) (0.0162) (0.0288) (0.0279) (0.0298)
Treat×File 0.0419 0.0295* 0.0165 0.0277** 0.0352* 0.0305
(0.0315) (0.0159) (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0184) (0.0229)
Treat×List 0.0458*** 0.0330*** 0.0253** 0.0364*** 0.0548*** 0.0473**
(0.0135) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0131) (0.0197) (0.0234)
Treat×Lockup 0.0281* 0.0128 0.00801 0.0239** 0.0367 0.0317
(0.0160) (0.0112) (0.0120) (0.0102) (0.0267) (0.0340)
Observations 419,206 419,206 1,495,796 669,780 419,206 279,646
R-squared 0.667 0.676 0.638 0.669 0.677 0.686
Firm-level cluster X X X X X X
Year-Month-Firm FE X X X X X X
Firm-Treatment FE X X X X X
Year-Month-Treatment X X
Note: Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Housing characteristics include building age, age square, lot size, square footage, number
of bathrooms, number of bedrooms, number of total rooms, number of stories and indicators for housing conditions. All sample temporal restrictions
refer to the years pre-IPO announcement and post-IPO stock lockup expiration. Models are limited to properties located within 5 or 10 miles of the
nearest corporate headquarters.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Falsification Tests of the Effects of IPO Activity on Property Values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 years earlier 3 years earlier
Sample restrictions 1 year pre & post 2 years pre & post 1 year pre & post 2 years pre & post
File 0.00203 0.000656 0.0193 0.0175
(0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0177) (0.0174)
List -0.0386 -0.0361 0.0479* 0.0444*
(0.0277) (0.0283) (0.0241) (0.0239)
Lockup 0.00328 0.0028 0.0428 0.0359
(0.0263) (0.0252) (0.0295) (0.0297)
Treat×File -0.0191* -0.0129 -0.0127 -0.00373
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0117)
Treat×List 0.00594 0.00671 -0.0161 -0.00265
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0126) (0.0136)
Treat×Lockup -0.0186 -0.00368 -0.0166 0.0118
(0.0146) (0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0131)
Observations 374,554 647,681 375,380 649,112
R-squared 0.672 0.678 0.667 0.666
Firm-level cluster X X X X
Year-Month-Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Treatment FE X X X X
Note: Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. These are the results from difference-in-differences
specifications that move the IPO filing date forward for a falsification test. The number of years the filing
date is shifted refers to how many years the open date is shifted forward.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 8: Housing Composition Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Age Lot size Rooms Bedrooms Stories Square ft
File -0.913 -30,979 -0.011 -0.024 -0.018 -9.659
(0.5880) (31782) (0.0629) (0.0179) (0.0187) (20.31)
List -0.543 -10,715 -0.0606 -0.0460* -0.0292 -38.92
(0.8270) (12034) (0.0604) (0.0236) (0.0185) (31.02)
Lockup -1.296 -11,430 -0.00477 -0.0342 -0.0341 -739.5
(1.0310) (31692) (0.0785) (0.0332) (0.0222) (709.30)
Treat×File 0.0818 104,103 0.0106 -0.013 -0.00821 -4.012
(0.3000) (109878) (0.0297) (0.0118) (0.0091) (13.63)
Treat×List -0.131 8,990 -0.00596 0.00696 0.00601 -58.61
(0.4370) (19931) (0.0372) (0.0114) (0.0073) (53.32)
Treat×Lockup -0.347 -135,005 -0.0358 -0.013 0.0018 -13.97
(0.3630) (100246) (0.0349) (0.0107) (0.0072) (14.96)
Observations 419,206 419,206 419,206 419,206 419,206 419,206
R-squared 0.473 0.017 0.616 0.698 0.328 0.019
Firm-level cluster X X X X X X
Year-Month-Firm FE X X X X X X
Firm-Treatment FE X X X X X X
Note: Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. These linear regressions put the housing char-
acteristics on the left-hand side and interactions of the treatment indicator and post-IPO variable on the
right-hand side as in the primary difference-in-differences estimation.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects of IPO Activity on Property Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Above Below Within Below median Above median
restriction expectation expectation expectation proceeds proceeds
File -0.00963 0.0796*** -0.0164 0.0112 0.0296
(0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0230) (0.0199)
List -0.00188 0.0654** -0.0321 -0.0176 0.0294
(0.0292) (0.0261) (0.0332) (0.0365) (0.0268)
Lockup 0.0397 0.0588* 0.0145 0.0262 0.0432
(0.0354) (0.0304) (0.0412) (0.0384) (0.0319)
Treat×File 0.0151 0.0656*** 0.0192 0.0128 0.0465***
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0106) (0.0109)
Treat×List 0.0559*** 0.0215** 0.0221* 0.0291** 0.0337***
(0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.00913)
Treat×Lockup 0.0396*** 0.00135 0.00262 0.00501 0.0263***
(0.0088) (0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0130) (0.00789)
Observations 146,129 124,602 132,886 220,734 198,471
R-squared 0.69 0.716 0.694 0.691 0.707
Firm-level cluster X X
Year-Month-Firm FE X X X X X
Firm-Treatment FE X X X X X
Year-Month-Treatment X X X X X
P-value: Test γ2 − γ1=0 0.0029 0.0006 0.8363
Note: Robust errors are in parentheses in columns (1)-(3) [each group include less than 30 firms], clustered
standard error by firm are in parentheses in columns (4) -(5). Sample restriction refers to how the sample
was split for each heterogeneity analysis. The temporal selection for each of these specifications uses housing
data from one year pre-IPO announcement and post-IPO stock lockup expiration. Models are limited to
properties located within 5 miles of the nearest IPO firm headquarters.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 10: Impact of IPOs on Demographics and Amenities
Variables Log(income)
Share of residents with Share of resident with
log(Restaurants)income < 25k income > 200k
Post-File -0.00009 -0.00152 0.000164 0.0094
(0.0199) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0200)
Post-File×distance -0.00348 0.00210** -0.000656 -0.00851
(0.0053) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0059)
Observations 3,737 3,737 2,720 5,501
R-squared 0.982 0.978 0.986 0.980
Year FE X X X X
Zip Code FE X X X X
Note: Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. All samples are restricted to three years pre- and
post-IPO announcement. Models are limited to zip codes located within 5 miles of IPO firm headquarters.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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3.0 International Competition in the Race to Clean Technology
This chapter is coauthored with Douglas Hanley.
3.1 Introduction
Navigating the transition to low-emission energy infrastructure is one of the major chal-
lenges facing human civilization in the 21st century. Though few question the necessity of
such a transition, it still took a decade of multilateral negotiation to reach the Paris Agree-
ment. Under the agreement, countries determine their own carbon reduction targets with no
binding commitment. Furthermore, the United States withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
raises a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the nature and magnitude of the intervention
required to lead the transition. How will these environmental policies affect firms’ compet-
itiveness and innovation in a global economy? How will the game-theoretic interactions in
policies across countries change the speed of clean technology transition? These questions
are critical for the future of climate change and for the structure of the optimal policy.
In a closed economy, the carbon tax effectively increases the cost of dirty goods, shifting
demand to clean technologies and thus reducing emissions. However, such policies result
in carbon leakage, as other countries benefit from production and innovation in dirty tech-
nologies via international trade, which leas to an increase in carbon emissions. A clean
research subsidy can induce innovation in clean technologies. Over time, these technological
advances lower the cost of clean products. However, international technological competition
leads some countries to specialize in dirty sector. Therefore, a research subsidy may not pre-
vent the associated environmental externality. One possible measure against carbon leakage
is the introduction of carbon tariffs. With carbon tariffs, countries that have a stricter envi-
ronmental policy would impose a tariff on dirty imports. However, carbon tariffs encourage
dirty technologies innovation in domestic firms, may even generate large welfare loss when
there is retaliation by the foreign country and reduce the gain from trade. To understand
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effects of such international climate policies, a quantitative analysis necessitates an open-
economy model of innovation and international technological competition in clean and dirty
industries given the country-level environmental policies, and the direction of technological
change is determined as a function of these policies.
In this paper, we build a two-country and two-sector endogenous growth model where
clean and dirty technologies innovate to compete for global market leadership in final good
production. Our framework builds on the micro-founded directed technology change model
developed in Acemoglu et al. (2016a), which allows for a comprehensive quantitative eval-
uation. In both countries, the final good combines components produced using clean or
dirty intermediates goods. The intermediate goods may be sourced from foreign or domestic
producers. For each intermediate good, a home and a foreign firm compete for global mar-
ket shares, and they improve the quality of their product through international knowledge
spillover. The entrepreneurs in each country invest in R&D to enter the market. Meanwhile,
clean and dirty sector are competing for market share in final good production with the
dynamic evolution of technology. In addition to each country’s choice of research subsidy
and carbon tax levels, international trade opens up a new policy dimension in the form of
tariffs on dirty goods. We parameterize the model to match key trade, innovation, climate
and growth facts, with a specific focus on the US and China. Using standardized firm-level
data on research and patenting in both the US and China, we quantify the incentives for
both clean and dirty innovation faced by firms.
In laissez-faire and autarky, the allocation of innovation favors the leading technology
and therefore reinforce technological lead over time. As in Acemoglu et al. (2016a), the
allocation of innovation is path-dependent. If clean technologies are initially less advanced
than dirty ones, they will have a smaller market share in the final good production, thus
lower profitability. Therefore, the clean sector disappears completely, and the dirty sector
takes over the entire economy. In an open economy, the total output increases because
final good producers are able to import more productive intermediates overseas. Meanwhile,
the innovation rates rise as the open economy allows for international knowledge spillover.
However, the change in profits for each sector is ambiguous and depends on the initial
distribution of the technology gaps between the two countries. While we observe a slower
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transition to dirty technology in our model, the initial gap between clean and dirty technology
is too big to overcome, and consequently, the economic growth is not sustainable in the long
run.
Regarding policy evaluations, we first analyze the implications of unilateral carbon taxes.
We focus on welfare and climate implications of this policy change on a 300 years horizon.
The optimal carbon tax is determined by a rich set of externalities of carbon intermediate
production. First, a high carbon tax increases the cost of domestic dirty goods, reducing
the profitability of dirty intermediates producers on both domestics sales and exports. This
decrease leads to a relative increase in clean intermediates profitability and innovation, secur-
ing a transition from dirty to clean technology for the home country. However, such policies
generate a pollution haven effect, as the production of polluting intermediates moves to the
foreign country with no such policies, which may lead to an increase in carbon emissions
in the foreign country. Meanwhile, technology diffusion through international knowledge
spillovers increases the competitiveness of clean technologies in the foreign country. We find
that under the optimal unilateral carbon tax policies, the foreign countries slowly makes the
transition from clean to dirty technologies but dirty technologies not necessarily converge to
zero after the 300-year study period.
Next, we analyze the unilateral policies using clean R&D subsidies and carbon tariffs
respectively. The optimal unilateral makes a heave use of research subsidy because the social
planner would like to direct R&D from carbon-intensive dirty technologies towards clean
technologies in both countries as soon as possible. With the current estimate of international
knowledge spillover rate, the clean technology in the foreign country will consequently catch
up and increase the profitability of the clean sector relative to the dirty sector. A minimum of
46% research subsidy for either country can secure a transition from dirty to clean technology
globally. As an alternative policy option to reduce carbon emission, we consider an increase
in tariff on carbon imports. However, while the policy reduces the profitability of dirty
intermediate goods in the foreign country, clean technologies are initially too much behind
dirty technologies. The transition to dirty technology is slower comparing to laissez-faire but
converges to zero in the long run.
This paper is related to several strands of research in the literature. First, our paper
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is closely related to the literature on quantitative general equilibrium models on climate
change. In addition to pure climate science, economic studies of climatic effects on utility and
productivity, and microeconomic studies of the effects of policy on production and innovation
decisions, there is a growing literature devoted to using macroeconomic models to synthesize
the aforementioned results into assessments of the costs of climate change and measures
intended to mitigate it, as well as the nature of the optimal policy response thereto. The
literature started with the seminal work of Nordhaus (1994) and was extended by Nordhaus
and Boyer (2000), Krusell and Smith Jr (2009) and Hassler and Krusell (2012), among many
others. Golosov et al. (2014) formulate such an integrated assessment model (IAM) in a
neoclassical setting and find conditions under which the optimal policy response depends
upon the scale of potential climactic damages, but not on the current carbon concentration
in the atmosphere. A major shortcoming of the existing IAM research is the assumption of a
unified policy-making process, through the focus either on a single large country, such as the
US, or the entire world. In reality, country-level segmentation of markets will affect both the
incentives of firms to innovate and the optimal policy calculations of individual countries.
Our paper builds on the studies integrating directed technological change in the study
of climate change policies. The endogenous and directed technological change framework
we use is a model where producers choose between clean and dirty technologies as in Ace-
moglu (1998, 2002) and the latest developments by Acemoglu et al. (2012). This earlier work
is mainly theoretical, and the models are generally not designed for quantitative analysis.
Acemoglu et al. (2016a) develop a tractable microeconomics model in which the innova-
tion decisions of firms are endogenized and quantitatively characterize the optimal path of
research subsidy and carbon tax policy. However, they focus on a closed economy and ab-
stract from cross-country variation in policies. Therefore, their characterized optimal policy
makes heavy use of carbon taxes, while such taxes create negative externality by encouraging
foreign countries to innovate in dirty technology. He´mous (2016) extend the framework de-
veloped by Acemoglu et al. (2012) with international trade. In He´mous (2016), there are two
aggregated goods: polluting and non-polluting. Trade happens between the two countries
at the level of these aggregated goods, not in intermediates, as we do here. This leads to
two major differences. First, countries can specialize not just in clean or dirty technology,
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but also in particular clean or dirty technologies, meaning output complementarities can be
stronger across countries in our model. Second, countries directly compete in each product
line in our model, and thus the distribution of productivities across product lines matters.
This major differences makes the production structure more realistic and enabling us to use
microdata on innovation and production.
We introduce directed technological change on the growing literature on the impact
of international trade on firm dynamics. Analyzing various extensions of the canonical
Melitz (2003) framework, Burstein and Melitz (2013) discuss how firms innovation responses
determine transitional dynamics induced by trade liberalization. Akcigit et al. (2018) build
a model where firm innovation endogenously determines the dynamics of technology, market
leadership, and trade flows. They show that import tariffs generate at best short-term gains
at the expense of long-term losses, whereas policies that encourage innovations directly (e.g.,
R&D subsidies) create substantial long-term gains. Buera and Oberfield (2016) and Sampson
(2015) introduce diffusion of technologies into trade models with heterogeneous firms and
show that the gains from trade increase substantially compared to the static counterparts of
those models.
Finally, we contribute to the patent classification literature by analyzing the patent
text using machine learning. Researchers in economics have made frequent use of patents,
often in the form of patent count or patent citation (Hall et al., 2001; Abrams et al., 2013;
Acemoglu et al., 2016b). Recent studies use patent classification codes to identify emissions
reduction technologies (Aghion et al.,2016). Recognizing the importance of identifying such
clean patents, The European Patent Office (EPO) employs experts to tag climate change
mitigation technologies, but still heavily relies on International Patent Classification (IPC) or
the European Patent Classification (ECLA) (Veefkind et al.,2012). Because patents relating
to climate change mitigation technologies can be found in so many areas of technology, they
do not fall under one single dedicated classification section. Both clean and dirty technologies
could fall under the same the classification section, further complicating the classifying the
relevant patents. Our approach differs as we do not specify a priori which IPCs to search for,
but we classify patents as clean patents if their texts describe an invention that is a substitute
for carbon-emitting technologies or that directly mitigates the emissions of carbon-emitting
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tech.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our theoretical model
and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 describes the data and method we use for
classifying clean and dirty technology and outlines the calibration procedure. Section 4
discusses policy implications and optimal policies. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
In this section, we present a two-country and two-sector (clean and dirty) Richardian
model with international competition in technology. In each country, the final good combines
components produced using clean or dirty intermediates. The productivity of the dirty or
clean technologies for each intermediate is represented by a quality ladder. There is free
trade in intermediate and no trade in assets. In each country, there is an active firm in each
production line for clean/dirty intermediate goods, engaging in price competition to obtain
monopoly power of production. Production is also subject to taxes, so profit-maximizing
final good producers choose whether to import clean or dirty intermediates from foreign
countries as a function of taxes, trade costs, tariffs and the productivity gap between the
two countries. Research is conducted by only entrants, while incumbent firms improve the
quality of production with technology diffusion through international knowledge spillovers.
Finally, dirty technology contributes to carbon emissions, which create potential economic
damage. We next describe each aspect of the model in turn and characterize the equilibrium.
3.2.1 Preferences and Endowments
Our economy is in continuous time and admits a representative household in each country
i with a logarithmic instantaneous utility function and lifetime utility given by:
Ui,0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtlnCi,tdt
where Ci,t is the representative household’s consumption of country i at time t, and ρ > 0 is
the discount factor.
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There are two types of labor in the economy, skilled and unskilled. Unskilled workers are
used in the production of the active products, while skilled workers perform R&D activities.
In each period, the representative household has a fixed unskilled labor supply of measure
normalized to one, and skilled labor measure of LSi,t. The representative household maximizes
lifetime utility subject to the following budget constraint:
Pi,tCi,t + A˙i,t ≤ wui,t + wsi,tLSi,t +Ri,tAi,t − Ti,t
and the usual no-Ponzi condition. Here wui,t and w
s
i,t denote unskilled and skilled wages, Pi,t
is the price of the consumption good, Ri,t is the nominal return to asset holdings of the
household, and Ti,t is the net lump-sum tax/transfer used for balancing government budget.
The household in country i own all the firms in the country; therefore, the asset market
clearing condition requires that the asset holdings Ai,t have to be equal to the sum of all
domestic firm values.
3.2.2 Production
The final good, which is only used for consumption, is produced in each country through a
combination of clean component C and dirty component D, with an elasticity of substitution
ε > 1 (Papageorgiou et al., 2017). In addition, the final good production is negatively affected
by the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, which we denote by St. The aggregation is given
by
Yt = ν(St)
(
C
ε−1
ε
t +D
ε−1
ε
t
) ε
ε−1
= ν(St)Y¯t
where ν(St) = exp(−γ(St− S¯)) as in Golosov et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016a) and
where S¯ > 0 is the preindustrial level of the atmospheric carbon concentration, γ ≥ 0 is a
scale parameter.1
1
The current damage functional form assumes that the proportional cost of a unit increase in atmospheric
carbon concentration is the same across countries. This is likely to be to true because our quantitative
exercise focuses on U.S. and China, which share similar climates.
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These components are themselves composed from a continuum of intermediates j ∈ [0, 1]
with an elasticity of substitution equal to one:
logXt =
∫ 1
0
log xj,tdj
where (x,X) ∈ {(c, C), (d,D)}. The intermediates are aggregated into components then the
final good competitively.2 We will sometimes refer to clean and dirty “intermediates” as
clean and dirty “product lines”.
Firms in both countries may potentially produce each intermediate j. Firms produce
clean intermediates with linear production function as follows
cj,t = q
c
j,t`
c
j,t
where lcj,t is employment of production workers and q
c
j,t is the labor productivity of the
clean technology in product line j ∈ [0, 1]. The production function for dirty technology is
similar, except that it also creates carbon emission j,t. Assume that production in dirty
intermediates is Leontieff in labor and emissions
dj,t = q
d
j,t min{`dj,t, j,t/ζ}
Here, intermediate firms using dirty technology pay a certain tax τt = τˆw
u
t on emissions
j,t = ζ`
d
j,t.
3
Intermediate goods are produced not only for sale domestically but also internationally.
Firms with the most advanced technology for intermediate j in each country will compete
for the global market leadership. However, because of trade and carbon taxes, it is not
necessarily the country with the most advanced technology between these two will be able
2
It makes no differences whether this occurs in one or two stages.
3
The historical record indicates that the supply of fossil fuels has consistently increased over time and
that their relative price advantage over low-carbon energy sources has not declined substantially over time
(Covert et al., 2016). We simplify the discussion by not modeling the exhaustible resources.
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to export its good abroad. Given these taxes, the marginal cost of intermediate j in country
i is
MCci,j,t =

wui,t
qci,j,t
, if produced in country i
κwu−i,t
qc−i,j,t
, if imported from country− i
MCdi,j,t =

wui,t(1+ζτˆi)
qdi,j,t
, if produced in country i
κwu−i,t(1+ζτˆ−i)(1+bi)
qd−i,j,t
, if imported from country− i
where κ is the iceberg trade cost and bi is the carbon trade tax imposed by country i on
dirty imports. In equilibrium, only the firms with the lower marginal cost inclusive of taxes
and trade costs will choose to produce.
3.2.3 Innovation and the Quality Ladder
Labor productivity for each intermediate qxi,j improves through two channels. The first
is the entrants’ innovation. Every period, a new entrepreneur in each product line and from
each country invests in R&D to enter the market. If an entrepreneur is successful in her
research, the entrant firm replaces the domestic incumbent; otherwise, the firm disappears.
The second is knowledge diffusion, which occurs when a firm learns about ideas that have
been developed in other countries. The productivity improvement in country i and technol-
ogy x ∈ (c, d) is incremental. The labor productivity advance by λ > 1 in quality ladder
over the current domestic leading-edge technology of sector x. Hence, the labor productivity
of technology x in intermediate j at time t is qxi,j,t = λ
Nxi,j,t , where Nxi,j,t ∈ Z+ is the number
of effective steps that this country has taken in this technology since the initial date t = 0.
We assume the initial levels in both countries qxi,j,0 = 1, for and j ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ (c, d) that
without loss of generality.
Given this specification, the relative productivity of country i to its foreign competitor
in intermediate j in the clean or dirty sector can be written as
λn
x
i,j,t =
qxi,j,t
qx−i,j,t
=
λN
x
i,j,t
λN
x
−i,j,t
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where nxi,j,t = N
x
i,j,t − Nx−i,j,t is defined as the technological gap between two countries in
product line j in sector x ∈ (c, d). Let us next denote the tax-adjusted policy gap by n¯xi,t
such that
λn¯
x
i,t =
wui,t
κxiw
u
−i,t
⇒ n¯xi,t =
log(wui,t/w
u
−i,t)− log κxi
log λ
where
κxi =
κ, if x = c1+ζτˆ−i
1+ζτˆi
(1 + bi)κ, if x = d
The price-adjusted technology gap can, therefore, be written as:
qxi,j,t
qx−i,j,t
κxiw
u
−i,t
wui,t
= λn
x
i,j,t−n¯xi,t
The leading-edge tax-adjusted technology in country i is domestic if nxi,j,t > n¯
x
i,t; the two
countries are neck and neck if nxi,j,t = n¯
x
i,t; and country −i is the leading technology otherwise.
As we shall see, nxi,j,t is sufficient statistic for describing line-specific values, and we will
drop the subscript j thereafter when describing line-specific values. Let us denote zxi,t the
innovation rate of entrants in country i and α the rate of technology diffusion. Then the law
of motion for the technology gap nxi,t follows
nxi,t+∆t =

nxi,t + 1, with probability
(
zxi,t + α(−ni,t)
)
∆t+ o(∆t)
nxi,t − 1, with probability
(
zxi,t + α(ni,t)
)
∆t+ o(∆t)
nxi,t, otherwise
where α(n) = α · 1(n > 0) and o(∆t) are second-order terms that disappear faster than ∆t
as ∆t goes to zero.
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3.2.4 Trade and Market Equilibrium
Prices and Profits From the perspective of intermediate producers, the revenue accrued
is independent of price, so the state-of-the-art firm will prevail as a monopolist. In particular,
we will have
pxi,jxi,j = νX
ε−1
ε
i Y¯i
1
εPi
= X˜i
ε−1
ε YiPi
where X˜ = X
Y¯
and pxi,j is the price of the good in product line j of sector x ∈ (c, d).
With international trade, the intermediate-good producers are able to sell their goods
both domestically and internationally. Without loss of generality, we plot in Figure 12 the two
cutoffs that define three regions of product lines according to their relative technological gap
in the trade. The intermediate-good producers face different demand schedules depending
on the destination country. Therefore, the producer earns different levels of profits on these
goods.
Let us denote the first index in the subscript as the identity of the producer and the second
as the identity of the consumer. Assuming a Bertrand competition setting, the leading firms
will set their price to their nearest competitors marginal cost. For any intermediates sold
domestically, supposing there is a maximum markup of λm¯ that is enforced by domestic
competition, the markup is λmin{m¯,n
x
i,j−n¯xi }, ∀nxi,j > n¯xi . Then prices and production are
pci,i,j = λ
min{m¯,nci,j−n¯ci}w
u
i
qci,j
and ci,i,j = λ
−min{m¯,nci,j−n¯ci} q
c
i,j
wui
C˜i
ε−1
ε YiPi
pdi,i,j = λ
min{m¯,nci,j−n¯ci}w
u
i
q˜di,j
and di,i,j = λ
−min{m¯,nci,j−n¯ci} q˜
d
i,j
wui
D˜i
ε−1
ε YiPi
where we define the carbon tax price adjusted quality in dirty sector by q˜di,j =
qi.j
1+ζτi
. The
labor utilization and profit for each product j following profit maximization is then
wui `
c
i,i,j = λ
−min{m¯,nci,j−n¯ci}C˜i
ε−1
ε YiPi
wui `
d
i,i,j = λ
−min{m¯,ndi,j−n¯di } 1
1 + ζτˆi
D˜i
ε−1
ε YiPi
pixi,i,j = (1− λ−min{m¯,n
x
i,j−n¯xi })X˜i
ε−1
ε YiPi, x ∈ (c, d)
57
Intermediate firms will find it profitable to sell abroad when they when they have the
leading technology after adjusting taxes and trade costs. The markup exporting intermedi-
ates will then be λmin{m¯,n
x
i,j+n¯
x
−i},∀nxi,j > −n¯x−i. Given the demand from the other country,
similar derivations as in the case of domestic sales lead to the following prices and quantities
pci,−i,j = λ
−min{m¯,nci,j+n¯c−i}κw
u
i
qci,j
and ci,−i,j = λ−min{m¯,n
c
i,j+n¯
c
−i} q
c
i,j
κwui
C˜
ε−1
ε
−i Y−iP−i
pdi,−i,j = λ
−min{m¯,nci,j+n¯c−i}κw
u
i (1 + b−i)
q˜di,j
and di,−i,j = λ−min{m¯,n
c
i,j+n¯
c
−i} q˜
d
i,j
κwui (1 + b−i)
D˜
ε−1
ε
−i Y−iP−i
And the optimal quantity of labor utilization and associated profits are
wui `
c
i,−i,j = λ
−min{m¯,nci,j+n¯c−i} 1
κ
C˜
ε−1
ε
−i Y−iP−i
wui `
d
i,−i,j = λ
−min{m¯,ndi,j+n¯d−i} 1
κ(1 + ζτˆi)(1 + b−i)
D˜
ε−1
ε
−i Y−iP−i
pixi,−i,j = (1− λ−min{m¯,n
x
i,j+n¯
x
−i})
1
κ(1 + b−i)
X˜
ε−1
ε
−i Y−iP−i, x ∈ (c, d)
As we can see, ni,j is a sufficient statistic for describing line-specific values, and we will
therefore drop the subscript j when a line-specific value is denoted by n.
Production Allocation To determine the share of each component, We can aggregate
at the intermediate in each country to find
C˜
ε−1
ε
i =
(Qci∆
c
iΛ
c
i)
ε−1
(Qci∆
c
iΛ
c
i)
ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆi
)ε−1 (
Qdi∆
d
iΛ
d
i
)ε−1
D˜
ε−1
ε
i =
(
1
1+ζτˆi
)ε−1
(Qdi∆
d
iΛ
d
i )
ε−1
(Qci∆
c
iΛ
c
i)
ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆi
)ε−1
(Qdi∆
d
iΛ
d
i )
ε−1
and hence (
wui
νPi
)ε−1
= (Qci∆
c
iΛ
c
i)
ε−1 +
(
1
1 + ζτˆi
)ε−1
(Qdi∆
d
iΛ
d
i )
ε−1
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where we logQxt =
∫ 1
0
log qxj,tdj, x ∈ (c, d) is the productivity index of the economy by each
sector at time t. ∆xi represent the productivity gains from trade for country i
log(∆xi ) = log(λ)
∑
ni<n¯xi
µxi,n(n¯
x
i − ni)
Λxi is an inverse function of equilibrium markups following
log(Λxi ) = − log(λ)
∑
n
µxi,n min{m¯, |n− n¯xi |}
where µxi,n is the fraction of product lines where the country i’s lead is exactly equal to n
steps in sector x ∈ (c, d). We also define the the product shares that sells domestically and
imports abroad as
µ¯xi,i =
∑
nxi >n¯
x
i
µxi,n and µ¯
x
−i,i =
∑
nxi <n¯
x
i
µxi,n
Trade Balance Balance of trade requires that the (pre-tariff) value of imports by the
home country must be equal to the value of imports by the foreign country:∫ 1
0
1(nc−i,j > −n¯ci)pc−i,i,jc−i,i,jdj +
∫ 1
0
1(nd−i,j > −n¯di )pd−i,i,jd−i,i,jdj
=
∫ 1
0
1(nci,j > −n¯c−i)pci,−i,jci,−i,jdj +
∫ 1
0
1(ndi,j > −n¯d−i)pdi,−i,jdi,−i,jdj
Then combining with price and profit equations, the trade balance can be rewritten as[
µ¯c−i,iC˜
ε−1
ε
i + µ¯
d
−i,iD˜
ε−1
ε
i
]
YiPi =
[
µ¯ci,−iC˜
ε−1
ε
−i + µ¯
d
i,−iD˜
ε−1
ε
−i
]
Y−iP−i
So that
Ψi =
YiPi
Y−iP−i
=
µ¯ci,−iC˜
ε−1
ε
−i + µ¯
d
i,−iD˜
ε−1
ε
−i
µ¯c−i,iC˜
ε−1
ε
i + µ¯
d
−i,iD˜
ε−1
ε
i
=
µ¯i,−i
µ¯−i,i
Labor Market Clearing Then the labor market clearing condition leads to
Lp = 1 =
∫ 1
0
`ci,i,jdj +
∫ 1
0
`ci,−i,jdj +
∫ 1
0
`di,i,jdj +
∫ 1
0
`di,−i,jdj
That is,
wui =
[
λ¯ci,iC˜
ε−1
ε
i +
1
1 + ζτˆi
λ¯di,iD˜
ε−1
ε
i
]
YiPi +
1
κ
[
λ¯ci,−iC˜
ε−1
ε
−i +
1
(1 + ζτˆi)(1 + b−i)
λ¯di,−iD˜
ε−1
ε
−i
]
Y−iP−i
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where
λ¯xi,i =
∑
nxi >n¯
x
i
µxi,nλ
−min{m¯,nxi −n¯xi } and λ¯xi,−i =
∑
nxi >−n¯x−i
µxi,nλ
−min{m¯,nxi +n¯x−i}
Now combining it with labor market clearing condition, we can get the following
Ωi =
wui
wu−i
=
[
λ¯ci,iC˜
ε−1
ε
i +
1
1+ζτˆi
λ¯di,iD˜
ε−1
ε
i
]
YiPi +
[
λ¯ci,−iC˜
ε−1
ε
−i +
1
(1+ζτˆi)(1+b−i)
λ¯di,−iD˜
ε−1
ε
−i
]
Y−iP−i[
λ¯c−i,−iC˜
ε−1
ε
−i +
1
1+ζτˆ−i
λ¯d−i,−iD˜
ε−1
ε
−i
]
Y−iP−i +
[
λ¯c−i,iC˜
ε−1
ε
i +
1
(1+ζτˆ−i)(1+bi)
λ¯d−i,iD˜
ε−1
ε
i
]
YiPi
=
[
λ¯ci,iC˜
ε−1
ε
i +
1
1+ζτˆi
λ¯di,iD˜
ε−1
ε
i
]
Ψi +
[
λ¯ci,−iC˜
ε−1
ε
−i +
1
(1+ζτˆi)(1+b−i)
λ¯di,−iD˜
ε−1
ε
−i
]
[
λ¯c−i,−iC˜
ε−1
ε
−i +
1
1+ζτˆ−i
λ¯d−i,−iD˜
ε−1
ε
−i
]
+
[
λ¯c−i,iC˜
ε−1
ε
i +
1
(1+ζτˆ−i)(1+bi)
λ¯d−i,iD˜
ε−1
ε
i
]
Ψi
=
λ¯−1i,i Ψi + λ¯
−1
i,−i
λ¯−1−i,−i + λ¯
−1
−i,iΨi
Combining the equilibrium conditions, we can derive the total output as
Y¯i =
wi
ZPi
1
λ¯−1i,i + λ¯
−1
i,−i/Ψi
=
[
(Qci∆
c
iΛ
c
i)
ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆi
)ε−1
(Qdi∆
d
iΛ
d
i )
ε−1
] 1
ε−1
λ¯−1i,i + λ¯
−1
i,−i/Ψi
Carbon trade tax (rebate) for households will be:
Tb,i = µ¯
d
−i,i
bi
1 + bi
D˜
ε−1
ε
i YiPi − µ¯di,−i
b−i
1 + b−i
D˜
ε−1
ε
−i Y−iP−i
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3.2.5 The Carbon Cycle
Recall that while clean intermediate production ci,j creates no carbon emission, dirty
production di,j emits ζ units of carbon per production labor. This implies that the total
amount of carbon emission at time t is t = i,t + −i,t where
i,t = ζ(
∫ 1
0
`di,i,jdj +
∫ 1
0
`di,−i,jdj)
= λ¯di,i
ζ
wui,t + ζτi,t
D
ε−1
ε
i,t Y
1
ε
i,tPi,tZt+
λ¯di,−i
ζ
(wi,t + ζτi,t)(1 + b−i)
D
ε−1
ε
−i,tY
1
ε
−i,tP−i,tZt
Assume that the atmospheric carbon concentration follows:
St =
∫ t−T
0
(1− dl)t−ldl
where t = T is the first date when emission started and
1− dl = ϕp + (1− ϕp)ϕ0e−ϕl
is the amount of carbon emitted l years ago still left in the atmosphere; ϕp ∈ (0, 1) is the
share of emission that remains permanently in the atmosphere; (1 − ϕp)ϕ0 ∈ (0, 1) is the
fraction of the transitory component that remains in the first period; and ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is the
rate of decay of carbon concentration over time.
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3.2.6 Value Functions
The value function for an incumbent will depend on the step differential for that partic-
ular product line. The value function of the firm, for nxi > n¯
x
i , is then
RV xi (n)− V˙ xi (n) =pixi (n)− zxi [V xi (n)− 0] + zx−i [V xi (n− 1)− V xi (n)]
+ α(n) [V xi (n− 1)− V xi (n)] + α(−n) [V xi (n+ 1)− V xi (n)]
where pix,i(n) is the flow profit accrued from owning a product line given by
pixi (n) =
(
1− λ−min(m¯,|n−n¯xi |)) X˜ ε−1εi YiPi + 11 + b−i (1− λ−min(m¯,|n+n¯x−i|)) X˜ ε−1ε−i Y−iP−i
The first term on the right hand side is the operating profits generated from product line
leading the technology from the foreign country by n steps. In addition, at the flow rate zxi ,
the incumbent will be replaced by a domestic entrepreneur in the same sector. If instead,
the same product line experiences an innovation at a flow rate of zx−i in foreign country,
the technology gap between the two countries declines by one step. With the international
knowledge diffusion, there are two possibilities on technology improvement. First, if country
i was leading in technology x (n > 0), then the foreign country −i gain one step shorter from
country i with probability α. Second, if country −i was behind in technology x (n < 0), it
will have free access to technology n + 1 with probability α. Let us denote the normalized
value of a generic variable X as x˜. Using R− pi − g = ρ, we will have
ρv˜xi (n) =p˜i
x
i (n)− zxi [v˜xi (n)− 0] + zx−i [v˜xi (n− 1)− v˜zi (n)]
+ α(n) [v˜zi (n− 1)− v˜xi (n)] + α(−n) [v˜xi (n+ 1)− v˜xi (n)]
This has a closed form solution in steady state, but for a general dynamic path we must
leave it like this.4
4
See the proof in Appendix A.
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3.2.7 Firm Entry and Innovation
Every period, a unit mass of entrepreneurs in each country attempt to innovate at indi-
vidual product lines and enter the business (clean or dirty). A successful entrant improves
on the active domestic incumbents technology. Therefore, the value to an entrant will be
v¯xi =
∑
n
µxi,nv˜
x
i (n+ 1).
Here all entrants will pay a fixed cost F for a chance at a successful innovation, regardless
of which type they choose.
Thus the entrants’ problem will be
Πxi = max
axi
{axi v¯xi − (1− sxi )w˜si c(axi )− F} ≤ 0
where sxi is the subsidy rate that sector x receives from country i, a
x
i is innovation rate
per entrepreneur and c(a) = caη is the cost function of generating innovation rate a. The
free entry condition holds as equality whenever exi > 0, otherwise Π
x
i < 0. In order to
smooth these results, it is also advantageous to add a little bit of type-dependent noise to
the respective fixed costs, so that
F x = exp(ψx)F where (ψc, ψd) ∼ N (0, σ2)
Conditional on entry, the optimal innovation rate is given by:
axi =
(
v¯xi
(1− sxi )cw˜isη
) 1
η−1
Therefore, entrants will direct their R&D to the clean technology if v¯c/(1− sc) > v¯d/(1− sd)
and to the dirty technology if the reverse inequality holds.
Let us denote the endogenously determined mass of entrants performing R&D directed
to technology x in country i by Exi . Then a unit mass of entrants implies that
1 = Eci + E
d
i (3.1)
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For each country, the labor market-clearing condition for skilled workers, combining demand
from both clean and dirty industries, is
Lsi = c(a
c
i)E
c
i + c(a
d
i )E
d
i
Therefore, the aggregate innovation rate is zxi = E
x
i × axi .
Finally, the evolution of the distribution of technology gaps represented by µxi,n,t can be
derived from the following differential equations (with some initial condition {µxi,n,t}∞n=−∞).
For any n, we have
µ˙xi,n,t = (z
x
i,t + α(−n))µxi,n−1,t + (zx−i,t + α(n))µxi,n+1,t
− (zxi,t + α(−n) + zx−i,t + α(n))µxi,n,t
Intuitively, the share of product lines µxi,n,t changes when there is a difference in inflows
into and outflows from the technology gap of n steps. The first line on the right-hand side
refers to the inflows into position n from n− 1 due to domestic innovations and knowledge
spillover if domestic technology is behind and from n + 1 due to foreign innovations and
spillover effect if any. The second line refers to the outflows from µxi,n,t due to any innovation
and knowledge spillover in those lines with a technology gap of n steps. The total productivity
of the intermediates with n-step gap Qxi,n,t, which is characterized in similar reasoning, evolves
according to the following expressions:
Q˙xi,n,t = (z
x
i,t + α(−n))λQxi,n−1,t + (zx−i,t + α(n))Qxi,n+1,t
− (zxi,t + α(−n) + zx−i,t + α(n))Qxi,n,t
We now summarize the dynamic equilibrium path using the equations we have derived
in this section. For any given time path of policies
[
τxi,t, s
x
i,t, b
x
i,t
]t∈[0,∞)
x∈(c,d) , a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium of this world economy is an allocation
[
xi,t, p
x
i,t, a
x
i,t, E
x
i,t, Yi,t, w
s
i,t, w
u
i,t, ri,t, Si,t, {µxi,n,t, Qxi,n,t}∞n=−∞
]t∈(0,∞)
x∈(c,d)
such that [1] the sequences of xi,t, p
x
i,t maximize profits adjusting markup from domestic and
international competition ; [2] The innovation rates axi,t is determined by entrants’ profit
maximization and Ei,x,t clears the skilled labor market; [3] w
u
i,x,t clears labor markets in each
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country at every period t and
wui,t
wu−i,t
balance the trade; [4] the output Yi,t is given by combining
labor market clearing condition, trade balance, and intermediate goods aggregation; [5] wsi,t
are determined from free-entry condition equation; [6] technology gap shares {µxi,n,t}∞n=−∞
and quality indices {Qxi,n,t}∞n=−∞ evolve as a result of entrants’ innovation and knowledge
spillover; [7] the interest rate ri,t solves the Euler Equation from household’s optimization
problem; [8] the atmospheric carbon concentration Si,t follows emission dynamics defined in
section 3.2.5.
3.3 Data
In the calibrated model, we try to keep the least amount of heterogeneity across countries
in order to focus solely on the effect of policy differences. Our model has 16 parameters to
be determined:
{
ρ, gn, L
s, ε, λ, κ, α, c, η, S¯, ϕp, ϕ0, ϕp, γ, F, σ
}
initial gap between clean and dirty technologies, and the initial distribution of technology
gaps between countries in clean and dirty industries.
We estimate there parameters in three steps. First, we choose from external sources.
Second, we choose the initial distribution of technology gaps to match the distribution of
clean and dirty patents in each country as we explain below. Finally, we estimate the
remaining parameters using a simulated method of moments, with moments being selected
to model the growth rates, entry rates, exporting behavior, and production labor allocation.
3.3.1 External Calibration
We take the time discount parameter ρ = 1% following Acemoglu et al. (2016a). Fol-
lowing the empirical R&D literature, we choose the elasticity of successful innovation with
respect to scientists η as 2. We choose Ls = 0.08 to match the share of managers, scientists,
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and engineers in the workforce. We set the domestic markup step m¯ = 1. Following (Papa-
georgiou et al., 2017), we take the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty to be
ε = 2.5.5
We choose the set of parameters in the carbon cycle and damage function following
Golosov et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016a)’s approach. The pre-industrial stock of
carbon dioxide is 581 gigatons of carbon (GtC). We choose the three parameters ϕp, ϕ0, and
ϕ to model the dynamics of atmospheric carbon stock as follows. We set ϕp, the portion of
any emission pulse that will stay in the atmosphere for thousands of years, to 0.2, according
to the estimate in the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. The other
two parameters ϕ0 and ϕ models the excess carbon that does not stay the atmosphere forever.
We identify these parameters by matching the carbon stock evolution using the world actual
emissions data during the 1900 - 2012 period shown in Figure 13. We find a close fit at
parameter values ϕ0 = 0.7491 and ϕ = 0.0231.
As already noted, we assume the same damage function as in Golosov et al. (2014) and
Acemoglu et al. (2016a), which has a scale parameter γ = 5.3× 105−1GtC−1.
Finally, we set carbon emission per unit labor ζ = 2.188GtC to link the current world
emission levels to the baseline level of dirty sector labor demand. This formulation assumes
that emissions grow at a constant rate with the labor share in the dirty sector. Table 11 lists
these values.
3.3.2 Initial Patent Stock
3.3.2.1 Patent Data We rely on patent data for the characterization of the initial state
of technology for both the US and China. To do this, we interpret patents as indicators of
innovation, which in our model are proportional movements up the quality (productivity)
ladder. Thus the initial technological state will be the aggregation of past patenting activity.
To this end, our Chinese patent data spans from 1985 until the present day, while the US
5
Papageorgiou et al. (2017) finds that the estimates of the elasticity of substitution within the energy
aggregate are significantly greater than unityaround 2 for the electricity-generating sector and close to 3 for
the non-energy industries. We set the baseline value of ε to 2.5, the midpoint within the range of estimates
in different sectors.
66
patent data spans from 1976 to the present.
3.3.2.2 Patent Classification In order to properly map patents into our model, we
must have some idea of whether they are pertinent to clean or dirty technology. This
is a non-trivial exercise. Though existing patent classifications are rather detailed, even
within the same industry or when producing the same products, there are both clean and
dirty methods of production. For instance, energy generation can be done using coal or
solar, among other options. Steel production can be undertaken using methods that limit
emissions, and this is true for many other industrial processes as well. Additionally, on the
consumer side, there are a variety of technologies that reduce emissions associated with the
operation of automobiles, such as hybrid engines and catalytic converters.
To resolve this issue, we take a machine learning approach to the problem of patent
classification. Each patent has text associated with it in the form of the invention title, an
abstract describing the invention and its possible uses, formal claims related to the patent,
as well as patent classification codes and associated definitions.6 Using this text, we can
train a neural network classifier to predict whether patents are clean, dirty, or neither.
The trouble is finding a set of training data. There are no obvious existing candidates
out there, so we resort to constructing one by hand. In particular, we could randomly choose
1000 patents from each country/language and classify them as clean or dirty by hand. We
then train our classifier on this data and use the trained classifier to generate analogous
predictions for the entire set of patents. In our case, there are roughly 5.7 million US
patents and 5.5 million Chinese patents.
Hand classification of patents is, of course, a partially subjective exercise. In the end,
our trained classifier will embody all of the errors and biases present in our human judgment.
Nonetheless, we found that the classification decisions were a rather clean cut in the vast
majority of cases. We use the following working definitions for each category:
• Clean: anything that is a substitute for carbon-emitting technologies or that directly
mitigates the emissions of carbon-emitting tech.
6
There is also the full body text of the patent, however we find that the abstract contains most of the
pertinent information needed for classification
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• Dirty: anything that is or must be a complement to carbon-emitting technologies. For
example, a device to facilitate fueling (US9222452) is dirty, but technology relating to car
interiors (radio, display, etc) would be neither. Deep sea drilling is dirty (US4443000).
• Neither: aerospace not directly related to fuel and engines. Electricity distribution (but
not storage).
There is also the issue of comparability between language/country. Each patent office
may have slightly different standards for what should be included in abstracts, or even in what
constitutes a valid patent. Furthermore, there are certain lexicographic and semantic issues
that arise differentially in each language, such as the partial ambiguity of word boundaries
in the case of Chinese and variable conjugation and stemming in the case of English. In the
human classification, we attempted to maximize comparability in any dimension over which
we had control.
Many of the design decisions for the neural network are standard from the machine
learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) literature. We first convert each
document (patent text) into vectorized form. That is, each document is represented by a
vector in which each position indicates how many times a particular word appears. This
vector will be of length D where D is the number of words in our vocabulary, which consists
of any words that appear anywhere in the corpus two or more times.7 These vectors are
then fed into a fairly complex neural network classifier.
We use a two-layer neural network with 128 units in the hidden layer. With a resulting
vocabulary of about 3500, this results in a neural network with approximately half a million
parameters. Given our training set size, this presents potentially large overfitting issues. We
use two conventional techniques for dealing with this. One is to set aside a fraction (in our
case 20%) of the data for validation. That is, we train only on the remaining 80% of the data,
then use the validation set to ascertain whether overfitting has occurred (and potentially to
optimally terminate the training midway through). The second is to use dropout, in which
links in the neural network are randomly severed during the training process, forcing the
optimizer to arrive at solutions that rely on many different dimensions of the data at once,
7
This minor restriction will help deal with issues of rare misspellings.
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thus potentially limiting overfitting.
3.3.2.3 Patent to Step Distribution Now we map from patent counts into steps on
the quality ladder in our model. To generate one aggregate step, we need innovation in each
industry, of which there are N . One aggregate step increases productivity by a factor of λ.
Let the total number of (climate related) patents be P , and the number of patents in an
aggregate step be P0. Supposing we have 2% TFP growth (g = 0.02), we then need
g = log(λ)
P
NP0
*
How to map from patent counts by industry into our initial conditions, which are:
1. Relative productivities between US and China in both clean and dirty industries 2.
The ratio of log-log aggregated productivities between clean and dirty for both US and China
The first can got by directly simulating productivity evolution using patent data. Can
include a deterministic type of knowledge diffusion. To deal with different industry “sizes,”
scale all industries up to the average industry size.
The second can be gotten from patents as well, or somehow inferred from aggregates,
like a fraction of energy that comes from renewable sources. This involves the elasticity of
substitution ε as well.
Figure 14 plots the density of the resulting distribution of initial technology gaps in dirty
and clean technologies between the two countries.
3.3.3 Simulated Method of Moments
We have five remaining parameters λ, κ, C,
Qci,0
Qdi,0
and σ. For the first four of there pa-
rameters, λ, κ, C, and
Qci,0
Qdi,0
, we use the simulated method of moments (SMM) to calibrate
them. This approach chooses the parameter vector to minimize the distance between data
and model moments. We also choose the fixed cost heterogeneity parameter σ as 0.2 and
verify that our results are not sensitive to this choice of parameter.
The first data moment we use is the average growth rates of total factor productivity
in both countries, calculated in Feenstra et al. (2015). The next moment is the entry rate,
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which we derive using USPTO and SIPO patent data. As a third target, we use the average
export-to-GDP ratio to determine iceberg cost κ. The final moment is the dirty/clean
sector employment ratio, which we obtained from the 2016 U.S. Energy and Employment
Report. The targeted moments and the model performance in matching these moments are
summarized in Table 12. 8
Table 13 lists the internally calibrated parameters resulting from SMM. Our estimate of
the innovation step size γ = 1.091, implies a gross profit markup of 1.08. The combination
of the trade cost and the step size implies n¯ci = 2.6. That is, a firm need to lead by at
least three technological steps in our model to export. Our estimate shows that the total
productivity of dirty technology is 1.348 times of that of clean technology, which implies an
average of 3.7 technological steps leads by dirty technology.
3.4 Policy Analysis
3.4.1 Laissez-Faire
We start with the implied future equilibrium and atmospheric carbon paths of the model
under laissez-faire (no carbon taxes, research subsidies nor tariffs). We then compare the
results under autarky (and without knowledge spillovers). Given the initial distribution of
the technology gap between the two countries, dirty technology is more advanced relative
to clean technology in both countries. As shown in Figure 15, more of R&D is initially
targeted to the dirty technology for both open and closed economies. Moreover, with higher
innovation rates, technology gaps and the profitability of the dirty technologies increase
relative the those of clean technologies. As a result, the share of clean intermediates in the
final output drops rapidly, and clean R&D eventually converges to zero. In the long run, dirty
technology completely takes over the final good production. This time path of innovation
will lead to unbounded grow emissions. Figure 16 shows an increase in temperature of an
additional 4◦C in the next 250 years.
8
The computational algorithm is described in Appendix B.
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However, in a world with open economy, the transition to complete dirty technology is
slower, as the clean sector gains more profit relative to the dirty sector. This also leads to a
lower emission level and temperature increase in the long run. In the open economy, trade not
only allows more productive intermediate-doors producers to sell to the final good producers
in both countries but also increase the innovation rates allowing knowledge spillover. The
total welfare increases significantly by 28.6% and 25.1% for the U.S. and China respectively.
3.4.2 Unilateral Policy
3.4.2.1 Carbon Tax First, we compute the optimal carbon tax policies for each country.
Precisely, we compute the carbon tax rates that maximize the present discounted value of
welfare in a 300-year horizon from now on and calculate the welfare gains from the optimal
policy under autarky and from laissez-faire. Table 14 reports the results for the optimal
unilateral policy for each country.
Table 14 shows that the optimal unilateral carbon tax is 45% for a unilateral policy
taken by the U.S. while 29% when taken by China. This is because the dirty technologies in
China is less advantageous in China than it is in the U.S. In our model, the optimal carbon
tax is determined by a rich set of externalities of carbon intermediate production. First,
a high carbon tax increases the cost of domestic dirty goods, reducing the profitability of
dirty intermediates producers on both domestics sales and exports. This decrease leads to
a relative increase in clean intermediates profitability and innovation, securing a transition
from dirty to clean technology for the home country. However, such policies generate a
pollution haven effect, as the production of polluting intermediates moves to the foreign
country with no such policies, which leads to an increase in carbon emissions in the foreign.
Figure 17 - 20 show the transition paths of innovation and temperature under optimal
unilateral carbon tax policies in the U.S. and China.
3.4.2.2 Research Subsidy Next, we analyze the unilateral policies using clean R&D
subsidies respectively. The optimal unilateral makes a heave use of research subsidy be-
cause the social planner would like to direct R&D from carbon-intensive dirty technologies
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towards clean technologies in both countries as soon as possible. With the current estimate
of international knowledge spillover rate, the clean technology in the foreign country will
consequently catch up and increase the profitability of the clean sector relative to the dirty
industry. A minimum of 46% research subsidy for either country can secure a transition from
dirty to clean technology globally. Figure 21 - 24 show the transition paths of innovation
and temperature under optimal unilateral clean reseach subsidies in the U.S. and China.
3.4.2.3 Carbon Tariffs
3.4.2.4 Carbon Tariffs As an alternative policy option to reduce carbon emission, we
consider an increase in tariff on carbon imports. However, while the policy reduces the
profitability of dirty intermediate goods in the foreign country, clean technologies are initially
too much behind dirty technologies. The transition to dirty technology is slower comparing
to laissez-faire but converges to zero in the long run. As an alternative policy option to
reduce carbon emission, we consider an increase in tariff on carbon imports. However,
while the policy reduces the profitability of dirty intermediate goods in the foreign country,
clean technologies are initially too much behind dirty technologies. The transition to dirty
technology is slower comparing to laissez-faire but converges to zero in the long run. Figure
25 and 26 show the transition paths of innovation under optimal unilateral carbon tariffs in
the U.S. and China.
3.5 Conclusion
One of the biggest challenges facing the world economy is reducing carbon emissions,
which may only be feasible if a successful transition to clean technology is induced. This
paper has investigated the nature of a transition to clean technology considering cross-
country variation in policies and knowledge diffusing from international knowledge spillover.
We build a two-country and two-sector endogenous growth model where clean and dirty
technologies innovate to compete for global market leadership in final good production, which
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allows for a comprehensive quantitative evaluation. If clean technologies are initially less
advanced than dirty ones, they will have a smaller market share in the final good production,
thus lower profitability. Therefore, the clean sector disappears completely, and the dirty
sector takes over the entire economy. In a closed economy model, the optimal policy heavily
relies on both subsidies and carbon taxes. However, carbon taxes may create environmental
externality as the production of dirty intermediates shifts to the foreign country where there
are no carbon taxes. The paper argues that unilateral environmental policies should make
heavy use of clean research subsidies, which have the potential to reduce domestic emissions,
but also overseas either through technology diffusion or by slowing down the movement of
polluting industries there.
Our paper also left several questions unanswered, and we hope to tackle it in the future.
First, we have abstracted from finding the optimal policy path using a combination of carbon
taxes, research subsidies, and carbon tariffs, which is likely to improve the efficiency of
optimal unilateral policy using a single policy tool. Second, we have also abstracted from
optimal bilateral policies, especially game-theoretic interactions in policies between the two
countries. Finally, we hope to extend our analysis to multiple countries in both theory and
data work, allowing for a richer set of interactions across countries.
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3.6 Figures and Tables
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Figure 12: The Trade Flow
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Figure 13: Carbon Emission and Concentration: Data and Model Implications
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Figure 14: Patents Classification
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Figure 15: Laissez-Faire
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Figure 16: Time Path of Temperature Under Laissez-Faire
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Figure 17: Optimal Unilateral Carbon Tax - US
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Figure 18: Time Path of Temperature Under Optimal Unilateral Carbon Tax - US
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Figure 19: Optimal Unilateral Carbon Tax - CN
81
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of years
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 in
cr
ea
se
 (c
el
ci
us
 d
eg
re
ss
)
Carbon Tax China
Laissez-Faire Open Economy
Figure 20: Time Path of Temperature Under Optimal Unilateral Carbon Tax - CN
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Figure 21: Optimal Unilateral Research Subsidy - US
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Figure 22: Time Path of Temperature Under Optimal Unilateral Research Subsidy - US
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Figure 23: Optimal Unilateral Research Subsidy - CN
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Figure 25: Optimal Unilateral Carbon Tariffs - US
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Figure 26: Optimal Unilateral Carbon Tariffs - CN
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Table 11: Externally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Meaning Estimate
ρ Discount parameter 1%
Ls Mass of Scientists 0.08
m¯ maximum domestic markup 1
ε Elasticity of substitution 2.5
α International knowledge spillover 0.149
η R&D elasticity with respect to scientists 2
ϕp Carbon cycle 0.2
ϕ0 Carbon cycle 0.7491
ϕ Carbon cycle 0.0231
S¯ Pre-industrial Carbon Concentration 581 GtC
γ Scale parameter in damage function 5.3× 105−1GtC−1
ζ Carbon emission per unit labor in dirty sector 2.188 GtC
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Table 12: Model Fit
Moment Target Estimate Source
TFP Growth Rate 1.01% 1.02% Fed.
Entry Rate 15.12% 15.11% USPTO/SIPO
Export Share 15.16% 15.26% World Bank 2016
Dirty/Clean Labor Ratio 1.97 1.98 U.S. Energy and Employment Report 2015-2016
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Table 13: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Meaning Estimate
γ Innovation step size 1.091%
C Scale parameter of the R&D cost function 3.50
κ Iceberg cost 1.256
Qci,0
Qdi,0
Initial gap between clean and dirty sector 1.348
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Table 14: Optimal Unilateral Carbon Tax Policies
Optimal Carbon Tax Rate
Welfare Gains from Laissez-Faire Welfare Gains from Autarky
US China US China
US 45% - 3.77% 13.41 % 23.79% 41.91%
China 29% 22.99% 15.04 % 44.99% 45.35%
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4.0 Consumer Reviews and Employment Decisions: Evidence from Yelp.com
4.1 Introduction
With recent technology advancement, online consumer reviews have become increasingly
popular, as consumers can easily read ratings and reviews from platforms such as Yelp
and TripAdvisor, and make informed decisions about products and services (Anderson and
Magruder, 2012; Luca, 2016). The rising popularity and credibility of online review platforms
put business owners under growing pressure to maintain a good online reputation. While
consumers can acquire information from countless other consumers about product quality,
business owners also frequently read or respond to consumer reviews to improve products
and services (Proserpio and Zervas, 2017; Xie et al., 2016). Moreover, business owners may
use the information from consumer reviews to monitor their employee’s performance and
even fire employees who have been criticized on the site.1 In this way, the online reviewers
not only help other consumers but function as unpaid managers for the business.
Although the importance of consumer reviews is widely acknowledged, it is unclear how
business owners and managers respond to consumer reviews in their managerial decisions
on employment and wages. There are two primary channels through which consumer re-
views could affect managerial labor decisions. First, online reviews inform consumers about
product quality and thus shaping consumer demand (Anderson and Magruder, 2012; Luca,
2016). Higher demand requires local businesses to hire more workers and thus increase their
wage bills. Second, consumer reviews also inform business owners about their employees’
performance, helping them monitor and increase the worker productivity. However, on the
one hand, customer reviews can be biased and not credible (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006;
Luca and Zervas, 2016). On the other hand, consumer criticism does not necessarily lead
to labor discipline. For example, a long wait for lunch is easily blamed on a server, not on
owners decision to reduce the afternoon staff and thus lower cost by giving the server more
1
For example, https://www.yelp.com/topic/chicago-i-was-just-fired-for-a-1star-yelp-review;
https://www.yelp.com/topic/boston-getting-fired-over-a-yelp-review.
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work than they can handle.
In this paper, I study the relationship between online consumer reviews and managerial
labor decision, focusing on the key question of whether consumer reviews exert a causal
effect on businesses’ employment and wage bills. Having found a significant impact on
labor decisions, I then investigate the channels through which consumer reviews might affect
management decisions. Specifically, I study whether this increase is attributable to the
consumer reviews that mention customer service by employees in a business and its quality.
I use a newly assembled database that includes the information and consumer reviews of all
local businesses on Yelp.com in the city of Pittsburgh, combined with administrative data of
wage and employment for all establishments in Pittsburgh between 2009 and 2014. Figure
27 displays the geographical locations of all local businesses on Yelp.com in Pittsburgh Jan
2017. There was a substantial increase in businesses and consumer reviews on Yelp.com
since Yelp entered the market in Pittsburgh, as shown in Figure 28. The rich observations in
this data set allow me to measure the impact of consumer reviews on labor decisions while
controlling for individual fixed effects.
My empirical analysis exploits a key feature that Yelp.com round the average star rating
to the nearest half star. For example, a restaurant with an average rating of 4.24 displays
a 4-star average rating while a restaurant with an average rating of 4.26 displays a 4.5-star
average rating. I employ a regression discontinuity design that compares the number of em-
ployees and the total wage bill of local businesses with a rating just above the discontinuity
points and those with a rating just below the discontinuity points. I find that in the foodser-
vice industry one-star increase in Yelp rating leads to around a 3.5 increase in employment
and a $2,800 increase in total wage, but it has no effect on average wage per worker. These
effects on employment and total wage are also significant in the overall service industry.
Next I investigate whether consumer reviews on customer services has a direct impact
on the managerial decision. I extract the texts of all consumer reviews from 2005 to 2017
and train a machine learning algorithm on a sample of 1500 manually classified reviews to
sort reviews into service mentioned (bad or good) and service not mentioned reviews. I find
that most of the increase in employment and total wage bill arise from review counts, which
help attract more traffic to business pages on Yelp, rather than through reviews contents
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on services. The results suggest that business owners or managers may not use consumer
review contents as a significant indicator of managerial decisions.
This paper is related to a growing body of literature investigating how consumer re-
views, more specifically, quality disclosures affect consumer purchase behavior. Chevalier
and Mayzlin (2006) examine the effect of consumer reviews on book sales. They find that
an improvement in a book’s reviews leads to an increase in book sales. They also show that
customers read review texts rather than relying only on summary statistics. Luca (2016)
studies whether online consumer reviews influence the way that reputation is formed. He
has shown that a one-star increase in Yelp ratings results in a 5 to 9 percent increase in rev-
enue. He also finds that while consumers do not use all available information, they respond
more strongly when a rating contains more information. Anderson and Magruder (2012)
finds that an extra half-star rating causes restaurants to sell out 49% more frequently, with
larger impacts when other information is more scarce. Vermeulen and Seegers (2009) and Ye
et al. (2011) examine the impact of online reviews on consumer decision-making in the travel
context. They show that online travel reviews increase consumer awareness of lesser-known
hotels and thus increase online sales.
This paper contributes to the literature on management responses to online reputation.
Because online reviews play an important role in consumer decision-making, firms actively
manage or respond to customer reviews. For example, to manage unfavorable reviews, firms
tend to post fake reviews (Mayzlin et al., 2014; Luca and Zervas, 2016), solicit positive
reviews in exchange for perks, threaten legal action against negative reviewers, and use
nondisparagement clauses in sales contracts that stipulate fines if consumers write negative
reviews. With technological advancement in detecting fake reviews (Ott et al., 2011), man-
agers now frequently use public responses to consumer reviews as an alternative reputation
management strategy. Substantial previous research investigates the effects of a firms use of
management responses on its online reputation and performance (see, for example, Proserpio
and Zervas, 2017; Wang and Chaudhry, 2018; Xie et al., 2016). However, previous litera-
ture has not examined the extent to which business management decisions and labor market
outcomes respond to customer reviews. Using data on employment and wage at each local
business, I examine the relationship between online ratings and factors in reviews which may
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increase or decrease labor demand.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and sentiment analysis
on text reviews. I discuss the estimating methodology regression discontinuity design in
Section 3, and then in Section 4, I present regression results and robustness checks. Finally,
I conclude in Section 5.
4.2 Data
To estimate the effect of Yelp ratings on business management, I combine two inde-
pendent data sources. The first data set consists of the universe of Yelp reviews for all
businesses in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as of June 2014. The second data set consists of
wage and employment data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (ES202).
4.2.1 Yelp
Yelp.com is a major crowd-sourced review platform that contains more than 100 million
reviews for millions of shops, restaurants, and home and local services. Yelp users can submit
a review of any product or service with which they have dealt using a one to five star rating
system, and enter a text review. Businesses can also update contact information, hours and
other basic listing information or add special deals. In addition to writing reviews, users can
react to reviews, plan events, and make reservations. Yelp aggregates all reviews for a given
business and displays the average rating. Key to this paper is that when Yelp computes
the average rating, they round off to the nearest half-star. When a user browses or searches
Yelp.com, Yelp presents them with a list of businesses that meet their search criteria or fall
within the category of interest. For example, users can look for restaurants that exceed a
specified star rating (say 3.5 stars). Businesses are sorted according to relevance and rating,
and for each business, the average rating is displayed and rounded to the nearest half-star.
Yelp expanded its business to Pittsburgh in 2005, but very few online reviews were
available back then. During the past decade, Yelp has received over 180,000 reviews for
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about 8,000 businesses in Pittsburgh.
4.2.1.1 The Content of Consumer Review on Yelp.com Although Yelp rating re-
flects an overall experience of customers, the star ratings on Yelp do not provide any insight
into various aspects of a business such as environment, service or flavor. To understand
whether the business owners read the consumer reviews and use it to manage its employees,
I directly explore the service content of the customer text reviews. To answer such ques-
tions in the past would have required a great deal of effort to read and categorize the text
reviews. Modern machine learning techniques, however, allow me to extract the relevant
service content of customer reviews classifieds directly from the text.
I obtain all 75,993 text reviews for all businesses in Pittsburgh on Yelp.com from 2005
to 2014. I examine the text of 1,500 randomly chosen reviews and classify them as good
service, bad service or neither by hand. I classify text reviews as good (bad) service reviews
if (1) The review clearly mentions good (bad) service; (2) The reviewer is satisfied (dissat-
isfied) with the businesses in the following five dimensions in the SERVQUAL model first
proposed by Parasuraman et al. (1988): Reliability (the ability to perform the promised
service dependably and accurately); responsiveness (the willingness to help customers and
provide prompt service); tangibles (the physical facilities, equipment, and appearance of
personnel); assurance (the knowledge and courtesy of employees and their ability to inspire
trust and confidence); and empathy (the caring, individualized attention the firm provides
its customers). I classify reviews as neither if a review does not mention service or is directly
related to customer service.
I then train a convoluted neural network classifier on this data and use the trained
classifier to generate analogous predictions for the entire set of text reviews. Many of the
design decisions for the neural network are standard from machine learning (ML) and natural
language processing (NLP) literature. First, I pre-process the patent text so that only the
words (or parts of words) with the highest amount of useful information are retained. I then
convert each processed document into vectorized form. That is, each review is represented
by a vector in which each position indicates how many times a particular word appears.
These vectors are then fed into a relatively complex neural network classifier.
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I use a two-layer neural network with 128 units in the hidden layer. We end up with a
vocabulary of about 5,500. To limit potentially large overfitting issues, I use two conventional
techniques for dealing with this. One is to set aside a fraction (in this case 20%) of the data
for validation. That is, I train only on the remaining 80% of the data, then use the validation
set to determine whether overfitting has occurred (and potentially to terminate the training
midway through optimally). The second is to use dropout, in which links in the neural
network are randomly selected during the training process, forcing the optimizer to arrive
at solutions that rely on many different dimensions of the data at once, thus potentially
limiting overfitting.
Table 15 summarizes the performance of the classifier in the test data. The confusion
matrix provides information about where the manual coding and the machine learning al-
gorithm agreed and disagreed about the classification of different types of customer reviews
in the test data. Of the 300 test reviews, the manual and algorithm classifier agreed on
218 (133+19+66) reviews, giving an accuracy rate of 218/300 = 72.3%. The classifier is
particularly good at identifying “Neither” reviews, with a sensitivity rate (or the conditional
probability that the classifier assigns a ”Neither” review correctly) is 84.7 percent. The clas-
sifier has a decent sensitivity rate of 68.8 percent at identifying good service reviews. While
some share of misclassified reviews remains, it is important to reemphasize that I have only
analyzed a small sample of text reviews. Nevertheless, this type of textual analysis is an
important first step in any attempt to understand what yelp star rating measures and which
types of customer review may be read by business owners and managers.
4.2.2 Employment and Wage Data
The Covered Employment and Wages Program, commonly referred to as the ES-202
program, is a cooperative program involving the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the
U.S. Department of Labor and the State Employment Security Agencies (SESAs). The ES-
202 program produces a comprehensive tabulation of employment and wage information for
workers covered by State unemployment insurance (UI) laws and Federal workers covered
by the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program. It includes
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95.3 percent of civilian wage and salary employment across the United States.
I obtain all local businesses in the city of Pittsburgh in the confidential ES202 data.
The data contains every business that reported monthly employment and wage at any point
between January 2010 and June 2014. This dataset includes business from restaurants to
shopping malls to dentists.
I manually merged the employment data with the Yelp reviews, inspecting the two
datasets for similar or matching names. When a match is unclear, I referred to the ad-
dress from ES202 data. The final dataset is at the quarterly business data. The mean
rating is 3.6 stars out of 5. On average, a business receives one review per month. Figure
29 presents the unrounded and rounded average Yelp rating distribution in the Pittsburgh
area.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
I first implement a regression discontinuity approach to investigate whether consumer
reviews have a causal impact on business. A key feature of consumer reviews on Yelp is that
it displays the average rating for each restaurant. Users can limit searches to restaurants
with a given average rating. These average ratings are rounded to the nearest half a star, as
in Figure 30. This schedule provides variation in the rating that is displayed to consumers
that is exogenous to the business quality.
The regression discontinuity design is as follows:
yit = βTit + γratingit + ηi + δt + εit
where yit is the outcome of interest, number of employees and wage, for a business i in month
t; ratingit is the unrounded average rating for a business i in month t, ηi and δt are individual
and time fixed effects. I define T as a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the rating of a
business is just above a rounding threshold (so the rating is rounded up) and a value of 0 if
rating falls just below a rounding threshold (so the rating is rounded down). The coefficient
of interest is β, indicating the impact of moving from just below a discontinuity to just
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above a discontinuity. The baseline results only include a pooled sample with a bandwidth
of 0.01 stars. To show that the result is not being driven by choice of bandwidth, I vary the
bandwidth. In alternative results. I also allow for non-linear response to the rating.
To understand whether the business owners read the consumer reviews and use it to
manage its employees, I test whether consumer reviews regarding employee services has any
impact on employment decisions. Specifically, I estimate
yit = β1ratingit + β2ratingit × reviewsit + γratingit × reviews on serviceit + ηi + δt + εit
where reviewsit is the number of reviews for business i at time t; reviews on serviceit is the
number of reviews that mention employee service. The coefficient of interest is then γ. All
specifications will include individual and year-quarter fixed effects.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Cross-Section Results
I first describe the results from estimating a traditional cross-sectional analysis. The
observations in this regression are from all 1,446 restaurants matched to ES202 employment
and wage data in Pittsburgh. The regression includes year-by-quarter fixed effects and the
individual restaurant fixed effects. The year-by-quarter fixed effects provide the regression
with over time, while the individual fixed effect control for individual characteristics. This
is important since I have pooled observations of all Yelp star ratings to conduct the analysis
and the fixed effects force identification to come from rating change within an individual
restaurant over time. Table 17 provides the coefficients and their standard errors for the
three outcome variables. The coefficients on Yelp rating in columns (2) and (3) suggest that
one-star increase the total wage bill by approximately $116.3 and increase the average wage
per worker by a little more than 5.4% (statistically significant at the 10% level). Of course,
the concern with interpreting these estimates as the causal impact of Yelp on labor outcomes
is that they are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias, that is, changes in a restaurants
rating may be correlated with other changes in a restaurant s reputation.
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4.4.2 RDD Results
To help mitigate the concern of omitted variable bias in the analysis, I implement a
regression discontinuity design. The observations used in this regression are restricted to
those restaurants whose yelp rating is within 0.01 stars bandwidth of rounding thresholds.
The regression again includes year-by-quarter fixed effects and the individual restaurant
fixed effects. Besides the Yelp unrounded underlying rating that was included in the cross-
sectional analysis, an indicator for ratings just above the discontinuity is also included. The
coefficient estimates on the indicator are of primary interest in the regression discontinuity
analysis.
Table 18 presents coefficient estimates of baseline regression. I find that a one-star
improvement leads to a roughly 3.6 (12.8%) increase in employment and $ 2,880 (11.5%)
increase in total wage. However, it does not affect the average wage per worker. The
results are robust when controlling for the quadratic star rating. Figure 31 provides a
graphical analysis of demeaned employment, total wages and average wage per worker for
restaurants just above and just below a rounding threshold. There are discontinuous jumps
in employment and total wage bills, but not in average wage per worker.
In the main specification, I include only the restricted sample of restaurants that are less
than 0.01 stars away from a discontinuity. To show that the result is not being driven by
choice of bandwidth, I allow for alternative bandwidths. Table 19 displays the regression
results varying with bandwidth in the food service business. I find that the results are
robust to the bandwidth choice. I also explore the lagged impact of consumer reviews on
employment and wages by regression the outcome variables at t + 1 on ratings at t. While
there is no significant impact on employment and total wages, the average salary per worker
drop by a significant $ 53 (1.0%).
I have so far been using restaurants as my sample. One could also potentially expand to
the whole service industry. I redo the regression discontinuity design with a larger sample
- all service businesses in Table 20. The results suggest that a one-star improvement leads
to a roughly 2.4 (11.5%) increase in employment and $3,130 (12.5%) increase in total wage.
The results are consistent if I only include non-food service businesses in my sample as
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shown in Table 21. The result provides support to the claim that Yelp has a causal effect on
employment and total wage. In particular, the impact on restaurant and accommodations
industry is lower than the service industry due to the limited flexibility in labor discipline.
4.4.3 Reviews on Employee Services and Management Decision
One issue with how to interpret the results I have found has to do with whether the results
are driven by the shift in demand or online reviews informing the quality of employees’
customer services. If the business owners or managers care about the service content of
reviews, then I should observe employment or wage changes driven by the good or bad
services mentioned in the text reviews.
To explore the mechanism of the observed impact, I run a series of linear regressions,
using the same data as in the cross-section analysis, with the employment and wage variables
on the left-hand side and the Yelp rating and interactions with No. reviews on the right-
hand side. In these regressions, I continued to control for year-by-quarter fixed effects and
business-specific fixed effects. The coefficients on interaction terms are of primary interest as
they will signal if there were substantial changes in employment or wages after the number
of text reviews on customer services changes. Table 23, 24 and 25 provide the results from
these regressions. Column (1)s shows the results where we analyze the relationship between
employment decisions and number of reviews on Yelp.com in a quarter, Column (2)s shows
the results where we include the interaction of customer reviews and underlying yelp rating,
and Column (3)s shows the results where we decompose the service reviews to good or
bad services. Of all the interaction coefficients that are estimated these tables, only the
interaction of yelp rating and the number of quarterly reviews is statistically significant (all
at the 1% level) suggesting that the number of reviews has a positive impact on employment
decisions. However, none of the interaction coefficients of yelp rating and the number of
customer reviews on service are statistically significant. Overall, these regressions do not
seem to suggest that business owners use customer reviews to measure their employees
performance and then adjust their employment decisions.
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4.5 Conclusion
While online reviews become increasingly popular on the internet, there has been no
academic work that attempted to understand its implication on managerial labor decisions.
Online reviews not only help other customers understand more of the business itself, but it
also serves as a “hidden manager” to the companies. In this paper, I studied the customer
reviews of all business on Yelp.com in Pittsburgh. Using a regression discontinuity design, I
find that in the restaurant industry a one-star increase in Yelp rating leads to a 3.5 increase
in employment and a $2,800 increase in total wage, but it has no effect on wage per worker.
These effects also hold in the overall service industry. This paper shows that the service in-
dustry is responsive to consumer reviews. By analyzing consumer reviews regarding services
with a text-mining approach, my results show that consumer reviews on employees services
do not seem to change employment decisions significantly.
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4.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 27: Businesses on Yelp in Pittsburgh
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Figure 28: Yelp Review Trend
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Figure 29: Yelp Rating Distribution
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Figure 30: Yelp Rating Schedule
Note: Yelp prominently displays a restaurants rounded average rating. Each time a restaurants rating crosses
a rounding threshold, the restaurant experiences a discontinuous increase in the displayed average rating.
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Figure 31: Discontinuous Changes in Rating
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Table 15: Confusion Matrix for Predictions on the Test Data
Test Data Prediction
Manual
Neither Bad Service Good Service
Neither 133 1 23
Bad Service 14 19 14
Good Service 30 0 66
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Table 16: Summary Statistics of Businesses on Yelp in Pittsburgh
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev
All Businesses
Employment 23,346 36 153
Total wage $23,346 $82,779 $679,158
Wage per worker $23,346 $1,587 $1,326
Restaurants
Employment 18,031 26 32
Total wage $18,031 $38,724 $68,895
Wage per worker $18,031 $1,329 $657
Note: All statistics are per quarter per business.
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Table 17: Impact of Yelp Rating On Employment and Wage
Dependent (1) (2) (3)
Variables Employment Total wage Wage per worker
Rating -0.00167 116.3 5.433*
(0.131) (74.79) (2.83)
Individual FE X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X
Observations 18,031 18,031 18,031
R-squared 0.979 0.98 0.696
Businesses 1446 1446 1446
Note: Rating is the star rating on Yelp. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 18: RD Estimates - Restaurants (bandwidth: 0.01 stars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variables Employment Employment Total Wage Total Wage Average Wage Average Wage
Discontinuity 3.576*** 3.513*** 2,880** 2,870** 11.19 10.6
(1.231) (1.187) (1,155) (1,159) (23.17) (23.13)
Dependent Variables Lg(Employment) Lg(Employment) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Average Wage) Lg(Average Wage)
Discontinuity 0.128* 0.127* 0.115 0.112 -0.0129 -0.0147
(0.0668) (0.0662) (0.0829) (0.0821) (0.0452) (0.0450)
Rating X X X X X X
Rating Quadratic X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X X X X
Observations 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086
Businesses 530 530 530 530 530 530
Note: Rating is the star rating on yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 19: RD Estimates - Difference Bandwidths
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Employment Total wage Average Wage Employment Total Wage Average Wage
Discontinuity 1.216** 1,318** -5.677 0.248 569.9* 1.343
(0.596) (592.7) (19.05) (0.332) (314.6) (11.93)
Rating X X X X X X
Rating Quadratic X X X X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X X X X
Observations 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,804 1,804 1,804
Businesses 609 609 609 723 723 723
Bandwidth (Stars) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Note: Rating is the star rating on yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 20: RD Estimates - All Services Business (0.01 stars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variables Employment Employment Total Wage Total Wage Average Wage Average Wage
Discontinuity 2.358* 2.362* 3,130* 3,132* 20.32 20.41
(1.247) (1.228) (1,839) (1,843) (23.35) (23.51)
Dependent Variables Lg(Employment) Lg(Employment) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Average Wage) Lg(Average Wage)
Discontinuity 0.115** 0.115** 0.125* 0.125* 0.0108 0.0110
(0.0571) (0.0572) (0.0685) (0.0682) (0.0422) (0.0424)
Rating X X X X X X
Rating Quadratic X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X X X X
Observations 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584
Businesses 726 726 726 726 726 726
Note: Rating is the star rating on yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 21: RD Estimates - Non Restaurants (Bandwidth: 0.05 stars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variables Employment Employment Total Wage Total Wage Average Wage Average Wage
Discontinuity 3.891** 4.050** 4,488 4,636 24.08 24.08
(1.808) (1.839) (2,942) (2,970) (33.11) (33.16)
Dependent Variables Lg(Employment) Lg(Employment) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Average Wage) Lg(Average Wage)
Discontinuity 0.0406* 0.0425* 0.0533** 0.0548** 0.0127 0.0122
(0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0230) (0.0230)
Rating X X X X X X
Rating Quadratic X X X
Individual FE X X X X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X X X X
Observations 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088
Businesses 322 322 322 322 322 322
Note: Rating is the star rating on yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 22: Regression Discontinuity Estimates - Restaurants (Lagged Dependent
Variables)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variables Employment Total Wage Average Wage
Discontinuity -0.183 -1,908 -53.15**
(2.342) (2,134) (25.83)
Dependent Variables Lg(Employment) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Average Wage)
Discontinuity 0.0324 -0.0635 -0.0958**
(0.0991) (0.1010) (0.0470)
Rating X X X
Rating Quadratic X X X
Individual FE X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X
Observations 1,021 1,021 1,021
Businesses 499 499 499
Note: Rating is the star rating on yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significance at the 1% level.
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Table 23: Response to Reviews on Services - Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variables Lg(Employment) Lg(Employment) Lg(Employment)
Rating -0.0157*** -0.0157*** -0.0155***
(0.00538) (0.00538) (0.00540)
Rating × No. of reviews 0.00306*** 0.00309*** 0.00308***
(0.00036) (0.00042) (0.00036)
Rating× No. of reviews -0.000619
on services (0.00066)
Rating× Share of reviews 0.000218
on bad services (0.00619)
Rating×Share of reviews -0.000799
on good services (0.00145)
Observations 18,031 18,031 18,031
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.964
Individual FE X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X
Businesses 1430 1430 1430
Note: Rating is the star rating on Yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 24: Response to Reviews on Services - Total Wage
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variables Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Total Wage) Lg(Total Wage)
Rating -0.0176** -0.0174** -0.0170**
(0.00717) (0.00717) (0.00718)
Rating × No. of reviews 0.00401*** 0.00442*** 0.00409***
(0.00051) (0.00058) (0.00052)
Rating× No. of reviews -0.001
on services (0.00083)
Rating× Share of reviews -0.00282
on bad services (0.00658)
Rating×Share of reviews -0.00260
on good services (0.00183)
Observations 18,031 18,031 18,031
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.961
Individual FE X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X
Businesses 1430 1430 1430
Note: Rating is the star rating on Yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 25: Response to Reviews on Services - Average Wage
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variables Lg(Average Wage) Lg(Average Wage) Lg(Average Wage)
Rating -0.00183 -0.00165 -0.00147
(0.00611) (0.00611) (0.00612)
Rating × No. of reviews 0.000954*** 0.00134*** 0.00101***
(0.000327) (0.000417) (0.000329)
Rating× No. of reviews -0.000939
on services (0.000603)
Rating× Share of reviews -0.00304
on bad services (0.00460)
Rating×Share of reviews -0.00180
on good services (0.00151)
Observations 18,031 18,031 18,031
R-squared 0.778 0.778 0.778
Individual FE X X X
Year Quarter FE X X X
Businesses 1430 1430 1430
Note: Rating is the star rating on Yelp. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* The estimate is significant at the 10% level.
** The estimate is significant at the 5% level.
*** The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Additional Theoretical Results
Proof of Lemma 1 Substituting V xi = v˜
x
i × PiYi into value functions, we get:
Rv˜xi (n)PiYi − ˙˜vxi (n)PiYi − v˜xi (n)P˙iYi − v˜xi (n)PiY˙i =
pixi (n)− zxi [v˜xi (n)PiYi − 0] + zx−i [v˜xi (n− 1)PiYi − v˜xi (n)PiYi]
+ α(n) [v˜xi (n− 1)PiYi − v˜xi (n)PiYi] + α(−n) [v˜xi (n+ 1)PiYi − v˜xi (n)PiYi]
Dividing all sides by PiYi, we derive the following result:
(R− pii − gY )v˜xi (n) + ˙˜vxi (n) =p˜ixi (n)− zxi [v˜xi (n)− 0] + zx−i [v˜xi (n− 1)− v˜zi (n)]
+ α(n) [v˜zi (n− 1)− v˜xi (n)] + α(−n) [v˜xi (n+ 1)− v˜xi (n)]
where
p˜ixi (n) =
pixi (n)
PiYi
=
(
1− λ−[n−n¯xi ]m¯0
)
X˜
ε−1
ε
i +
1
(1 + b−i)Ψi
(
1− λ−[n+n¯x−i]m¯0
)
X˜
ε−1
ε
−i
Applying Euler Equation R− pii − gY = g, we obtain the desired results.
Static Effects of Openness
Autarky: Supposing said competitor is behind by the ratio λm¯ so that prices and
production are
pcj,t =
λm¯wut
qcj,t
and cj,t =
qcj,t
λm¯wut
C˜t
ε−1
ε YtPt
pdj,t =
λm¯(wut + ζτt)
qdj,t
and dj,t =
qdj,t
λm¯(wut + ζτt)
D˜t
ε−1
ε YtPt
This will result in labor utilization of
`cj,t =
1
λm¯wut
C˜t
ε−1
ε YtPt and `
d
j,t =
1
λwut
(
1
1 + ζτˆ
)
D˜t
ε−1
ε YtPt
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The profit for each product line j in either industry then is
pixj,t = (1− λ−m¯)X˜t
ε−1
ε YtPt
To determine the shares of each component in autarky, we can integrate the intermediates
to find
C˜t =
(
Qct
λm¯wut
)ε
P εt Z
ε
t and D˜t =
(
1
1 + ζτˆ
)ε(
Qdt
λm¯wut
)ε
P εt Z
ε
t
where we define the productivity index of the economy by each sector at time t as logQxt =∫ 1
0
log qxj,tdj, x ∈ (c, d). In what follows, we drop the time subscripts when this causes no
confusion.
From the final good production function we have the component share as
C˜ =
 (Qc)ε−1
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε−1
(Qd)ε−1

ε
ε−1
and D˜ =

(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε−1 (
Qd
)ε−1
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε−1
(Qd)ε−1

ε
ε−1
and (
λm¯wu
PZ
)−1
= (Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1 + ζτˆ
)ε−1 (
Qd
)ε−1
In the static equilibrium, the labor market clearing, with a unit mass of production labor,
leads us to
1 =
∫ 1
0
`cjdj +
∫ 1
0
`djdj
⇒ Y¯ = λw
u
PZ
1
C˜
ε−1
ε +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)
D˜
ε−1
ε
⇒ Y¯ =
[
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε−1 (
Qd
)ε−1] εε−1
[
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
(Qd)ε−1
]
This implies
C =
(Qc)ε[
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
(Qd)ε−1
] and D =
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε (
Qd
)ε[
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
(Qd)ε−1
]
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Since C = QcLc and D = 1
1+ζτˆ
QdLd, this also means that
Lc =
(Qc)ε−1[
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
(Qd)ε−1
] and Ld =
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε (
Qd
)ε−1[
(Qc)ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
(Qd)ε−1
]
Let the ratio of aggregated productivity be S = Qc/Qd. We can express the component
share as
C˜ =
 Sε−1
1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε−1
Sε−1

ε
ε−1
and D˜ =

(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε−1
Sε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε−1

ε
ε−1
and
Lc =
Sε−1
1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
Sε−1
and Ld =
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
Sε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆ
)ε
Two important qualitative conclusions follow from equations above: First, carbon taxes
increase production cost of dirty intermediates, thus lowering dirty component share in
final good production. Second, more importantly, clean/dirty market size depends on the
aggregate technology gap between these two sectors. Then the allocation of innovation
exhibits path-dependence because of the market size effect: a more advanced technology has
a larger market which increases the profits of subsequent innovators.
Now consider a simplified open economy without iceberg trade cost. Case 1 - No Carbon
Taxes (τˆi = ˆτ−i = 0)
Y¯ Oi =
[
(Qci∆
c
i)
ε−1 + (Qdi∆
d
i )
ε−1] 1ε−1
Y¯ Ci =
[
(Qci)
ε−1 + (Qdi )
ε−1] 1ε−1
where ∆xi represent the productivity gains from trade for country i
log(∆xi ) = log(λ)
∑
ni<n¯xi
µxi,n(n¯
x
i − ni)
Because ∆xi > 1 as long as there is productivity different across the two countries, we have
Y¯ Oi > Y¯
C
i .
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The product shares now becomes
X˜
ε−1
ε
i =
(Qxi ∆
x
i )
ε−1
(Qci∆
c
i)
ε−1 +
(
Qdi∆
d
i
)ε−1
So C˜Oi > C˜
C
i and C˜
O
−i < C˜
C
−i, if ∆
c
i > ∆
d
i ; C˜
O
i ≤ C˜Ci and C˜O−i ≥ C˜C−i, if otherwise.
The profits for clean and dirty intermediates in the open economy i are
Πx,Oi = µ
x
i,i(1− λm¯)X˜
ε−1
ε
i YiPi + µ
x
i,i(1− λm¯)X˜
ε−1
ε
−i Y−iP−i
while in autarky,
Πx,Ci = (1− λm¯)X˜
ε−1
ε
i YiPi
However, the impact of openness on profits is not obvious. In contrast to the state of
autarky, the open economy allows relatively more productive firms to sell to a larger market
by providing the opportunity to export. Yet, at the firm level the selection channel implies
that less productive domestic firms lose their profits to foreign competitors, which they would
earn otherwise in autarky, causing a decline in aggregate profit income. As a result, the net
effect of openness on total profits remains ambiguous. As a result, the net effect of openness
on total profits remains ambiguous.
Case 2 - Unilateral Carbon Tax Only
Now consider this economy only subject unilateral carbon taxes. If country i raise carbon
tax of τi, then the total output becomes
Y¯i =
[
(Qci∆
c
i)
ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆi
)ε−1
(Qdi∆
d
i )
ε−1
] ε
ε−1
(Qci∆
c
i)
ε−1 +
(
1
1+ζτˆi
)ε
(Qdi∆
d
i )
ε−1
Y¯−i =
[
(Qc−i∆
c
−i)
ε−1 + (Qd−i∆
d
−i)
ε−1] 1ε−1
To understand the impact of carbon taxes on technological change, we focus on the profit
change in clean and dirty sectors. A large carbon tax could lead to a decrease in
∆di
∆ci (1+ζτˆi)
.
As a result shares of dirty intermediates in both countries drops. Meanwhile, imposing car-
bon tax make it hard for the home country to produce and export dirty intermediates (µdi,i
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becomes smaller). However, while the rising clean sector shares make it more profitable to
produce and export clean intermediates. As a result, the home country who implement the
unilateral carbon tax policy will secure a shift from dirty technology to clean technology.
However, the foreign country are now encouraged to produce more dirty intermediates, re-
sulting in the pollution heaven effect. A unilateral carbon tax cannot generally secure a
transition to clean technology.
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Appendix B
Computational and Estimation Algorithms
Because the theoretical analysis shows that the key firm decisions are independent of
climate dynamics, we therefore start with solving for wage ratios, value functions, innovation
rates, and distributions first, then use those to first the time path for the carbon stock,
temperature, and other variables of interest.
We construct a fixed point method to solve this model and find the transition dynamics.
The algorithm is a forward backward solution method, in which we first update the product
line distribution (µx) in the forward direction and the value functions (V
x
i ) in the backward
direction, using the long-term (clean or dirty) steady state as the terminal condition.
To solve for the fixed point of the sequence of value functions, We discretize time into
N = 500 steps and set a terminal period T = 400. Due to the symmetry between the two
countries inherent in this model (knowledge spillover), when a single type of technology is
dominant in the sense that the technology gap distribution is heavily skewed to either clean
or dirty technology one can compute value functions and innovation rates in the steady
state. We use these values as terminal conditions, though we do not know in advance which
technology (clean or dirty) will be dominant eventually. In addition, we set the upper and
lower bounds on the step gap distribution space to 20. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Start iteration h = 0 with the guess on long-term steady state dominant technology
(clean or dirty) and assume the terminal value functions to be the true value function.
Instantiate the technology gap distribution using the patent data in subsection 3.3.2.
{v˜xi,t}h=0 = v˜xi,T and {µxt }h=0 = µx0 ,∀t
2. At iteration h, take value function and product distributions guesses at time t +
1, {v˜xi,t+1, µxt }h as given and solve innovation rates zxi by forward iteration. Using these
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innovation rates, update the time t + 1 product distribution µxt+1
h+1 using discrete time
versions of the flow equations.
3. At iteration h, take value function and product distributions guesses at time t +
1, {v˜xi,t+1, µxt }h as given and solve innovation rates zxi by forward iteration. Using these
innovation rates, update the time t + 1 product distribution µxt+1
h+1 using discrete time
versions of the flow equations.
4. Repeat steps 2-4 and check if the convergence criterion
max |{v˜xi,t}h+1 − {v˜xi,t}h| < 
is met. t. We use  = 10−4
5. Find the implied dominant technology at the terminal period by determining which
technology type has a higher aggregate innovation rate as some late stage period T − TP
(we use TP = 40). Repeat steps 1 - 4 with implied dominant technology until the dominant
strategy is same as the initial guess.
In order to avoid any instability, particularly when one is close to a threshold where
the asymptotically dominant technology switches over, we also introduce heterogeneity in
entrant’s fixed costs as explained in the text.
All code of our solution algorithm is written is standard Python 3, and depends only on
common numerical and scientific modules such as numpy, scipy, pandas, statsmodels, patsy,
and matplotlib. The parameter estimation and optimal policy calculations are done using
either the Nelder-Mead algorithm or simulated annealing.
126
Bibliography
Alexander Borisov, Andrew Ellul, and Merih Sevilir. Access to public capital markets and
employment growth. Technical report, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10521., 2015.
Shai Bernstein. Does going public affect innovation? The Journal of Finance, 70(4):1365–
1403, 2015.
Casey Dougal, Christopher A Parsons, and Sheridan Titman. Urban vibrancy and corporate
growth. The Journal of Finance, 70(1):163–210, 2015.
Stuart S Rosenthal and William C Strange. Geography, industrial organization, and agglom-
eration. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(2):377–393, 2003.
Mohammad Arzaghi and J Vernon Henderson. Networking off madison avenue. The Review
of Economic Studies, 75(4):1011–1038, 2008.
Gabriel M Ahlfeldt, Stephen J Redding, Daniel M Sturm, and Nikolaus Wolf. The economics
of density: Evidence from the berlin wall. Econometrica, 83(6):2127–2189, 2015.
Martin Kenney, Donald Patton, and Jay R Ritter. Post-IPO employment and revenue growth
for US IPOs, June 1996-2010. Report for the Kauffman Foundation, 2012.
David Weild, Edward Kim, and Lisa Newport. Making stock markets work to support
economic growth. OECD Publishing, 2013.
David Card, Kevin F Hallock, and Enrico Moretti. The geography of giving: The effect of
corporate headquarters on local charities. Journal of Public Economics, 94(3):222–234,
2010.
Michael Greenstone and Enrico Moretti. Bidding for industrial plants: Does winning a
million dollar plant increase welfare? Mimeograph, 2004.
Michael Greenstone, Richard Hornbeck, and Enrico Moretti. Identifying agglomeration
spillovers: Evidence from winners and losers of large plant openings. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 118(3):536–598, 2010.
Holger Sieg, V Kerry Smith, H Spencer Banzhaf, and Randy Walsh. Estimating the general
equilibrium benefits of large changes in spatially delineated public goods. International
Economic Review, 45(4):1047–1077, 2004.
Siqi Zheng and Matthew E Kahn. Does government investment in local public goods spur
gentrification? Evidence from Beijing. Real Estate Economics, 41(1):1–28, 2013.
127
Stephen B Billings, Eric J Brunner, and Stephen L Ross. Gentrification and failing schools:
The unintended consequences of school choice under NCLB. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 100(1):65–77, 2018.
Alexander W Butler, Larry Fauver, and Ioannis Spyridopoulos. Local economic consequences
of stock market listings. 2016.
Jess Cornaggia, Matthew Gustafson, and Kevin J Pisciotta. Public ownership and the local
economy. 2018.
Jay R Ritter and Ivo Welch. A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations. The Journal
of Finance, 57(4):1795–1828, 2002.
Michelle Lowry. Why does IPO volume fluctuate so much? Journal of Financial Economics,
67(1):3–40, 2003.
Karl E Case and Robert J Shiller. The efficiency of the market for single-family homes. The
American Economic Review, 79(1):125–137, 1989.
Karl E Case and Robert J Shiller. Forecasting prices and excess returns in the housing
market. Real Estate Economics, 18(3):253–273, 1990.
Richard Meese and Nancy Wallace. Testing the present value relation for housing prices:
Should I leave my house in San Francisco? Journal of Urban Economics, 35(3):245–266,
1994.
Michelle Lowry and G William Schwert. Is the IPO pricing process efficient? Journal of
Financial Economics, 71(1):3–26, 2004.
Jos Van Bommel and Theo Vermaelen. Post-ipo capital expenditures and market feedback.
Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(2):275–305, 2003.
Atif Mian and Amir Sufi. The consequences of mortgage credit expansion: Evidence from
the US mortgage default crisis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4):1449–1496,
2009.
Louis S Jacobson, Robert J LaLonde, and Daniel G Sullivan. Earnings losses of displaced
workers. The American Economic Review, pages 685–709, 1993.
Sandra E Black. Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elementary education. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2):577–599, 1999.
Kenneth Y Chay and Michael Greenstone. Does air quality matter? Evidence from the
housing market. Journal of Political Economy, 113(2):376–424, 2005.
Kevin Haninger, Lala Ma, and Christopher Timmins. The value of brownfield remediation.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
128
Devin G Pope and Jaren C Pope. When Walmart comes to town: Always low housing prices?
Always? Journal of Urban Economics, 87:1–13, 2015.
Jose´ Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall I Steinbaum. Labor market concentration. Tech-
nical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman, and Hyunseob Kim. Strong employers and weak employ-
ees: How does employer concentration affect wages? Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2018.
Kevin Rinz. Labor market concentration, earnings inequality, and earnings mobility. Tech-
nical report, CARRA Working Paper Series, 2018.
Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, Douglas Hanley, and William Kerr. Transition to clean
technology. Journal of Political Economy, 124(1):52–104, 2016a.
William D Nordhaus. Managing the global commons: the economics of climate change,
volume 31. MIT press Cambridge, MA, 1994.
William D Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer. Warming the world: economic models of global
warming. MIT press, 2000.
Per Krusell and Anthony A Smith Jr. Macroeconomics and global climate change: Transition
for a many-region economy. 2009.
John Hassler and Per Krusell. Economics and climate change: integrated assessment in a
multi-region world. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(5):974–1000, 2012.
Mikhail Golosov, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski. Optimal taxes on fossil
fuel in general equilibrium. Econometrica, 82(1):41–88, 2014.
Daron Acemoglu. Why do new technologies complement skills? directed technical change
and wage inequality. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4):1055–1089, 1998.
Daron Acemoglu. Directed technical change. The Review of Economic Studies, 69(4):781–
809, 2002.
Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous. The environ-
ment and directed technical change. American Economic Review, 102(1):131–66, 2012.
David He´mous. The dynamic impact of unilateral environmental policies. Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 103:80–95, 2016.
Marc J Melitz. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry
productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725, 2003.
129
Ariel Burstein and Marc Melitz. Trade liberalization and firm dynamics. In Advances in
Economics and Econometrics Tenth World Congress. Applied Economics, volume 2, pages
283–328, 2013.
Ufuk Akcigit, Sina T Ates, and Giammario Impullitti. Innovation and trade policy in a
globalized world. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.
Francisco J Buera and Ezra Oberfield. The global diffusion of ideas. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
Thomas Sampson. Dynamic selection: an idea flows theory of entry, trade, and growth. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(1):315–380, 2015.
Bronwyn H Hall, Adam B Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. The nber patent citation data file:
Lessons, insights and methodological tools. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2001.
David S Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit, and Jillian Popadak. Patent value and citations: Creative
destruction or strategic disruption? Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 2013.
Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, and William R Kerr. Innovation network. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 113(41):11483–11488, 2016b.
Philippe Aghion, Antoine Dechezlepreˆtre, David Hemous, Ralf Martin, and John
Van Reenen. Carbon taxes, path dependency, and directed technical change: Evidence
from the auto industry. Journal of Political Economy, 124(1):1–51, 2016.
Victor Veefkind, J Hurtado-Albir, S Angelucci, K Karachalios, and N Thumm. A new epo
classification scheme for climate change mitigation technologies. World Patent Informa-
tion, 34(2):106–111, 2012.
Chris Papageorgiou, Marianne Saam, and Patrick Schulte. Substitution between clean and
dirty energy inputs: A macroeconomic perspective. Review of Economics and Statistics,
99(2):281–290, 2017.
Thomas Covert, Michael Greenstone, and Christopher R Knittel. Will we ever stop using
fossil fuels? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(1):117–38, 2016.
Robert C Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P Timmer. The next generation of the penn
world table. American economic review, 105(10):3150–82, 2015.
Michael Anderson and Jeremy Magruder. Learning from the crowd: Regression discontinuity
estimates of the effects of an online review database. The Economic Journal, 122(563):
957–989, 2012.
Michael Luca. Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of Yelp. com. 2016.
130
Davide Proserpio and Georgios Zervas. Online reputation management: Estimating the
impact of management responses on consumer reviews. Marketing Science, 36(5):645–665,
2017.
Karen L Xie, Zili Zhang, Ziqiong Zhang, Amrik Singh, and Seul Ki Lee. Effects of man-
agerial response on consumer ewom and hotel performance: Evidence from tripadvisor.
International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, 28(9):2013–2034, 2016.
Judith A Chevalier and Dina Mayzlin. The effect of word of mouth on sales: Online book
reviews. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(3):345–354, 2006.
Michael Luca and Georgios Zervas. Fake it till you make it: Reputation, competition, and
yelp review fraud. Management Science, 62(12):3412–3427, 2016.
Ivar E Vermeulen and Daphne Seegers. Tried and tested: The impact of online hotel reviews
on consumer consideration. Tourism Management, 30(1):123–127, 2009.
Qiang Ye, Rob Law, Bin Gu, and Wei Chen. The influence of user-generated content on
traveler behavior: An empirical investigation on the effects of e-word-of-mouth to hotel
online bookings. Computers in Human behavior, 27(2):634–639, 2011.
Dina Mayzlin, Yaniv Dover, and Judith Chevalier. Promotional reviews: An empirical
investigation of online review manipulation. American Economic Review, 104(8):2421–55,
2014.
Myle Ott, Yejin Choi, Claire Cardie, and Jeffrey T Hancock. Finding deceptive opinion
spam by any stretch of the imagination. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of
the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies-Volume 1,
pages 309–319. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2011.
Yang Wang and Alexander Chaudhry. When and how managers responses to online reviews
affect subsequent reviews. Journal of Marketing Research, 55(2):163–177, 2018.
Ananthanarayanan Parasuraman, Valarie A Zeithaml, and Leonard L Berry. Servqual: A
multiple-item scale for measuring consumer perc. Journal of Retailing, 64(1):12, 1988.
131
